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sufficient to enable adequate judicial review. See id. In reaching its <br /> conclusion, the court quoted with approval the following from a <br /> Rhode Island case addressing a zoning board's decision: <br /> [I]t does not follow that a decision of the zoning <br /> board will necessarily be reversed absent <br /> express findings of the ultimate facts upon <br /> which the decision must rest. It is well settled <br /> that, if upon an examination of the record this <br /> court can find from the evidence contained <br /> therein that the board necessarily acted on the <br /> basis of such findings, although not expressed, <br /> in the interests of practical justice we will not <br /> reverse the decision. Where a board of review <br /> acts affirmatively upon an application . . . the <br /> granting of which is conditioned upon the <br /> finding of ultimate facts prescribed in the <br /> ordinance, we will hold, in the absence of an <br /> express finding thereon, that there is an <br /> implicit finding in the decision of these <br /> prerequisite facts when the state of the <br /> evidence is such as would warrant the making <br /> of such finding by the board. <br /> Id. (quoting Cugini v. Chiaradio, 189 A.2d 798, 801 (R.I. 1963)). <br /> T b The principle from Sundance has since been repeatedly <br /> endorsed, if not expanded, by divisions of this court. See, e.g., <br /> Hudspeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 667 P.2d 775, 778 (Colo. App. <br /> 1983) ("The absence of express findings by a lay board does not <br /> affect the validity of the decision where the necessary findings are <br /> implicit in the action taken."); see also Fire House Car Wash, Inc. v. <br /> 40 <br />