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2022-03-16_PERMIT FILE - M2017036
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2022-03-16_PERMIT FILE - M2017036
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Last modified
1/14/2025 5:45:08 AM
Creation date
3/17/2022 8:51:14 AM
Metadata
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Template:
DRMS Permit Index
Permit No
M2017036
IBM Index Class Name
Permit File
Doc Date
3/16/2022
Doc Name
County Special Use Permit
From
Loveland Ready-Mix Concrete
To
DRMS
Email Name
BFB
MAC
Media Type
D
Archive
No
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a <br /> believe[s] [he has] a conflict of interest or . . . cannot make a fair <br /> and impartial decision in a legislative or quasi-judicial decision," to <br /> recuse. <br /> NLGC claims on appeal that Donnelly's receipt of campaign <br /> contributions from individuals associated with Ready-Mix and his <br /> behavior during the hearings constitutes evidence that his failure to <br /> recuse himself, contrary to Larimer County Code section 2-67(10), <br /> deprived NLGC of the constitutionally protected due process right to <br /> a neutral decision-maker. <br /> C. Discussion <br /> >� Because we presume statutes are constitutional, to succeed on <br /> an as-applied challenge, the challenger must establish the <br /> unconstitutionality of the statute, as applied to him or her, beyond <br /> a reasonable doubt.6 Indep. Inst. v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130, 1136 <br /> 6 NLGC argues that, in light of Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404, 407 <br /> (Colo. App. 2004), the district court should only have required it to <br /> show "a reasonable probability" that the provision was <br /> unconstitutional as applied. We are unpersuaded. In Sanger, the <br /> "reasonable probability" standard was applied in response to a <br /> motion for a preliminary injunction, which itself requires the <br /> moving party to demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that it will <br /> subsequently prevail on the merits. Id. at 409; see City of Golden v. <br /> Simpson, 83 P.3d 87, 96 (Colo. 2004). <br /> 19 <br />
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