2020-06-16_ENFORCEMENT - C1980007

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High Country Conservation Advocates v. United States Forest..., 951 F.3d 1217 (2020) "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned," but will not "supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given." State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (quotations omitted). discusses and the extent to which it discusses them." Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2002), as modified on reh'g, 319 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003). Under NEPA, an agency must include an environmental impact statement ("EIS") in reports on "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). An EIS must include, inter alia, "alternatives to the proposed action." § 4332(C) (iii). As explained in NEPA regulations, an EIS must "[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a); see also Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 868 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an environmental impact statement inadequate." (quotation omitted)). 171 In reviewing the adequacy of an agency's analysis of alternatives in an EIS, we apply a "rule of reason," determining whether the "statement contained sufficient discussion of the relevant issues and opposing viewpoints to enable the [agency] to take a hard look at the environmental impacts of the proposed [action] and its alternatives, and to make a reasoned decision." Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999). This "reasonableness standard applies both to which alternatives the agency 1101 Turning to the North Fork SFEIS, we must determine whether the Forest Service reasonably eliminated the Pilot Knob Alternative from detailed study. We judge the reasonableness of the agency action against two guideposts: (1) "the agency's statutory mandate" and (2) the "agency's objectives for a particular project." Id. at 709. With respect to the first guidepost, the Forest Service's statutory mandate grants it "broad discretion to regulate the national forests, including for conservation purposes." Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1234 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 551). It similarly possesses the authority "to manage the national forests for `multiple uses,' including `outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.' " Id. at 1235 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 528). We have little trouble concluding that the Pilot Knob Alternative, which would preserve one roadless area and open two others for coal mining, falls within the Forest Service's statutory mandate. As to the Forest Service's objectives for the particular project, the North Fork SFEIS states, "the specific purpose and need for reinstating the North Fork Coal Mining Area exception is to provide management direction for conserving about 4.2 million acres of [Colorado roadless areas] while addressing the state's interest in not foreclosing opportunities for exploration and development of coal resources in the North 181 191 "[O]nce an agency establishes the objective of the 141 151 161 "NEPA requires federal agencies to pause proposed action—which it has considerable discretion to before committing resources to a project and consider the define—the agency need not provide a detailed study of likely environmental impacts of the preferred course of action alternatives that do not accomplish that purpose or objective, as well as reasonable alternatives." N.M. ex rel. Richardson as those alternatives are not `reasonable.' " doming, 661 v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 703 (10th Cir. 2009). F.3d at 1244 (citations omitted). But agencies may not "define The "twin aims" of NEPA are to require agencies to "consider the objectives of a proposed action so narrowly as to preclude every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a a reasonable consideration of alternatives." Id. (quotation and proposed action" and to facilitate public involvement. Balt. alteration omitted). In short, "NEPA does not require agencies Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, to analyze the environmental consequences of alternatives 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983). NEPA creates it has in good faith rejected as too remote, speculative, "a set of action -forcing procedures that require that agencies or impractical or ineffective." Richardson, 565 F.3d at 708 take a hard look at environmental consequences, and that (quotation omitted). Moreover, "an agency need not consider provide for broad dissemination of relevant environmental an alternative unless it is significantly distinguishable from information." Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, the alternatives already considered." Id. at 708-09. 490 U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (quotations and citation omitted). However, it "is strictly a procedural statute" that "does not mandate substantive results." Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1237. *1224 A Under NEPA, an agency must include an environmental impact statement ("EIS") in reports on "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). An EIS must include, inter alia, "alternatives to the proposed action." § 4332(C) (iii). As explained in NEPA regulations, an EIS must "[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a); see also Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 868 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an environmental impact statement inadequate." (quotation omitted)). 171 In reviewing the adequacy of an agency's analysis of alternatives in an EIS, we apply a "rule of reason," determining whether the "statement contained sufficient discussion of the relevant issues and opposing viewpoints to enable the [agency] to take a hard look at the environmental impacts of the proposed [action] and its alternatives, and to make a reasoned decision." Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999). This "reasonableness standard applies both to which alternatives the agency 1101 Turning to the North Fork SFEIS, we must determine whether the Forest Service reasonably eliminated the Pilot Knob Alternative from detailed study. We judge the reasonableness of the agency action against two guideposts: (1) "the agency's statutory mandate" and (2) the "agency's objectives for a particular project." Id. at 709. With respect to the first guidepost, the Forest Service's statutory mandate grants it "broad discretion to regulate the national forests, including for conservation purposes." Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1234 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 551). It similarly possesses the authority "to manage the national forests for `multiple uses,' including `outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.' " Id. at 1235 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 528). We have little trouble concluding that the Pilot Knob Alternative, which would preserve one roadless area and open two others for coal mining, falls within the Forest Service's statutory mandate. As to the Forest Service's objectives for the particular project, the North Fork SFEIS states, "the specific purpose and need for reinstating the North Fork Coal Mining Area exception is to provide management direction for conserving about 4.2 million acres of [Colorado roadless areas] while addressing the state's interest in not foreclosing opportunities for exploration and development of coal resources in the North