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1 <br /> <br />BEFORE THE MINED LAND RECLAMATION BOARD <br />STATE OF COLORADO <br /> <br /> <br />IN THE MATTER OF COTTER CORPORATION’S REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY <br />CESSATION FOR SR-13A Mine (Permit No. M-1977-311); SR-11 Mine (Permit No. <br />M-1977-451); Mineral Joe Claims, (Permit No. M-1977-284); C-LP-21 Mine (Permit No. <br />M-1977-305); JD-9 Mine (Permit No. M-1977-306); CM-25 Mine (Permit No. M-1977- <br />307); JD-6 Mine (Permit No. M-1977-310); SM-18 Mine (Permit No. M-1978-116); JD- <br />7 Pit (Permit No. M-1979-094-HR). <br /> <br /> <br />OBJECTORS’ RESPONSE TO COTTER’S MOTION <br />ON BURDEN OF PROOF <br /> <br /> <br />This Response is submitted on behalf of Information Network for Responsible Mining <br />(INFORM), Earthworks, San Juan Citizens Alliance, and Sheep Mountain Alliance (Objectors)1 <br />and rebuts the attempt by Cotter Corporation (Cotter) to shift the burden of proof in this <br />proceeding entirely to the Objectors. <br />Cotter bases its motion on two arguments 1) that the Objectors are automatically the <br />“proponent” of the order because if Objectors are successful in their opposition, the MLRA will <br />trigger final reclamation and termination proceedings; and 2) that Objectors bear the burden of <br />proof because the Board decided that the prior appeal to the Board, under a different provision of <br />the law, placed the burden on the objectors. Both of these arguments fail. <br /> <br />1 Confusingly, Cotter repeatedly refers to the Objectors as “Petitioners” – in an apparent attempt <br />to use terminology as if it might bolster its argument to shift the burden. As discussed below, <br />this hearing is taking place because Cotter specifically requested the Board to hold a hearing and <br />issue an order – and the statute requires a hearing so that the Board might act on Cotter’s <br />application for a second term of temporary cessation. Because Cotter is making the request, <br />Cotter is the true “petitioner”. Lawyer tricks aside, as set forth herein, Cotter bears the initial <br />burden of demonstrating the availability of and entitlement to a wholly discretionary second term <br />of temporary cessation.