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CONSERVATION GROUPS’ COMMENTS <br />UNCOMPAHGRE FIELD OFFICE RMP AND DEIS <br />71 <br />that gas-aerosol interactions amplify methane’s impact such that methane is actually 105 times as <br />potent as CO2 over a twenty-year time period. These values should be used—or at the very least <br />acknowledged—in the DEIS, but are instead ignored. <br /> <br />Even setting aside the issue of climate change, every ton of methane emitted to the <br />atmosphere from oil and gas development is a ton of natural gas lost. Every ton of methane lost <br />to the atmosphere is therefore a ton of natural gas that cannot be used by consumers. Methane <br />lost from federal leases may also not yield royalties otherwise shared between federal, state, and <br />local governments. This lost gas reflects serious inefficiencies in how BLM oil and gas leases are <br />developed. Energy lost from oil and gas production—whether avoidable or unavoidable— <br />reduces the ability of a lease to supply energy, increasing the pressure to drill other lands to <br />supply energy to satisfy demand. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16(e)-(f). In so doing, inefficiencies create <br />indirect and cumulative environmental impacts by increasing the pressure to satisfy demand with <br />new drilling. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, 1508.8(b). <br />1. Mineral Leasing Act’s Duty to Prevent Waste. <br /> <br /> Conservation Groups, and in particular the Western Environmental Law Center, have <br />been urging field offices throughout the West to adopt common sense and economical measures <br />to address the issue of fugitive methane waste. Though not fully realized here, the UFO has <br />expansive authority—and, indeed, the responsibility and opportunity—to prevent the waste of oil <br />and gas resources, in particular methane, which is the primary constituent of natural gas. The <br />Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (“MLA”) provides that “[a]ll leases of lands containing oil or gas ... <br />shall be subject to the condition that the lessee will, in conducting his explorations and mining <br />operations, use all reasonable precautions to prevent waste of oil or gas developed in the land....” <br />30 U.S.C. § 225; see also 30 U.S.C. § 187 (“Each lease shall contain...a provision...for the <br />prevention of undue waste....” As the MLA’s legislative history teaches, “conservation through <br />control was the dominant theme of the debates.” Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 481 (1963) <br />(citing H.R.Rep. No. 398, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13; H.R.Rep. No. 1138, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. <br />19 (“The legislation provided for herein...will [help] prevent waste and other lax methods....”)). <br /> <br /> BLM’s implementing regulations, reflecting these provisions, currently provide that <br />“[t]he objective” of its MLA regulations “is to promote the orderly and efficient exploration, <br />development and production of oil and gas.” 43 C.F.R. § 3160.0-4. In part, “orderly and <br />efficient” operations are ensured through unitization or communitization agreements. 43 C.F.R. <br />§§ 3161.2, 3162.2-4(b) (BLM authority to require lessees unitization or communitization <br />agreements); 43 C.F.R. Subpart 3180 (general rules pertaining to drilling unit agreements). Such <br />agreements, because they may limit BLM authority in subsequent stages, must encompass <br />methane mitigation if they are to serve as tools for preventing waste. See William P. Maycock et <br />al., 177 IBLA 1, 20-21 (Dec. Int. 2008) (“BLM is not required to analyze an alternative that is <br />[n]ot feasible because it is inconsistent with the basic presumption of the Unit Agreement and <br />BLM cannot legally compel the operator to adopt that alternative under the terms of the Unit <br />Agreement”). <br /> <br />Report Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, Table 8.7 at 714 (attached as Exhibit <br />113).