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of the mine permitted operation, even if executed to term by the State. There <br />simply is no urgency or expectation for the State to treat the product with spite. <br />Also, property law is a complex matter. We wonder if the Office has considered <br />or even made known their intent or past actions to the other players whose rights <br />and interests must be met, such as: <br />1) The Landowner. The landowner has an interest in the surface and the <br />construction materials taken from the property. It should be remembered not <br />every Operator is a Landowner, and many Operators are both. <br />2) Royalty Owners. The royalty owner has a monetary interest in the stockpile. <br />Depriving them of the value of their material by squandering it is highly <br />inappropriate. <br />3) The Creditor(s). The Creditors rights are much like the Royalty Owner. They <br />have an interest in the assets they hold as collateral. Depriving them of the <br />right to make themselves whole in the event of a default is also inappropriate. <br />4) The Insurer(s). Much like the creditor. <br />5) A Successor to the Operator. Usually, if there is a pending forfeiture, a <br />Successor Operation can purchase the operation and make right what is wrong <br />by avenue of permit revision. This would act to assure the proper sale of <br />commercially viable deposits and prevent forfeiture. This also serves to <br />assure the reclamation of the affected lands to a beneficial use and any values <br />accorded to that use in the free market through the establishment of a <br />workable reclamation plan. <br />6) The free market returns us to the need to conserve the values of the land, the <br />water, and the natural resource these commercial deposits represent. To <br />dispose of a product stockpile by treating it as waste or a liability is <br />antithetical to the reason and purposes the Office of Mined Land Reclamation <br />exists, and a betrayal of its mission. <br />g) The current financial warranty amount does not account for the cost to reclaim the sand <br />stockpile. <br />i. Nor should it. There is no precedent or foundation in law, statute, or practice for <br />this expectation on the part of OMLR. <br />h) Per Rule 4.2.1(2), the Division may review any financial warranty for adequacy at any <br />time. <br />i) Considerable reclamation has occurred since the 2011 inspection. A financial <br />warranty reduction for the balance of activity is possible since the affected lands <br />were near their zenith at the time of the 2011 inspection. <br />ii) When this operation was virgin in 1999, there were no standing stockpile assets. <br />This matter puts forward the likelihood that for established mines with established <br />stockpiles, these assets may serve as vehicles to cover the genuine liabilities of <br />reclamation as a financial warranty. Varra Companies is exploring this potential <br />and in the process of having the stockpile appraised for this purpose. <br />i) The Division has estimated the cost to move the large sand stockpile in Tract A at <br />$419,219.00 (bond estimates and calculations were provided). <br />i. - The continued use of proprietary software by the OMLR lacks transparency. <br />Vats Companies, Inc. correspondence of 30 March 2015 to the Colorado Office of Mined Land Reclamation in 10 <br />reply to the OMLR Inspection Report of 28 August 2014 — Kurtz Project — M- 1999 -006 <br />