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judicial review. In relevant part, SCMRA provides: <br />"Subject to the requirements of subsection (2) of this section, any person having an <br />interest which is or may be adversely affected may commence a civil action on such <br />person's own behalf to compel compliance with the provisions of this article against: (a) <br />Any person or governmental agency or instrumentality who is alleged to be in violation <br />of any provision of this article or any rule or regulation promulgated or any order or <br />permit issued pursuant to this article..." C.R.S. § 34 -33- 135(1). <br />Subsection (2) of that same section specifies the conditions precedent to bringing suit under the <br />Act: <br />"No action may be commenced under: (a) Paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section <br />prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice in writing of the alleged violation, <br />setting forth such matters as the board shall by regulation prescribe, to the attorney <br />general, the board and office, and any alleged violator;..." Id. at (2)(a). <br />Significantly, the only condition precedent to suit is the giving of written notice to the affected <br />parties at least 60 days prior to suit, and even that requirement is waived where the violation <br />complained of constitutes an "imminent threat to health or safety." Id. at (2)(b). Finally, <br />subsection (6) of that section provides: <br />"Any person who is injured in person or property through the violation by an operator of <br />any rule or regulation promulgated or any order or permit issued pursuant to this article <br />may bring an action for damages, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, <br />against such operator only in the county where said violation occurred. Nothing in this <br />subsection (6) shall affect the rights established by or limits imposed under the workers' <br />compensation laws of this state." Id. at (6). <br />Thus, the statute plainly gives two types of remedies: a civil suit to compel compliance with the <br />Act under subsection (1) and a suit for damages against an operator under subsection (6). In both <br />cases the sole condition precedent to bringing an action is advance written notice of intent to sue <br />pursuant to subsection (2).4 Where the legislature could have restricted the application of a <br />statute, but chose not to, a reviewing court will not read additional restrictions or terms into a <br />statute. Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 804 (Colo. 2000). By its plain <br />4 As required by the Act, Plaintiffs provided written notice of their intent to sue on or about March 29, 2010. See <br />Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 3, and Exhibit 4. <br />0 <br />