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citizen suit provision]." 30 USCS § 1276(a)(2). No such language appears in the Colorado <br />judicial review provision at CRS § 34 -33 -128 or the entire Colorado Coal Program. Exhaustion <br />is required under Colorado law. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' First Claim for <br />Relief must be dismissed. <br />III. CRS § 34 -33 -135 Does Not Lift the Exhaustion Requirement. <br />Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief is one under the citizen suit provisions of CRS § 34- <br />33 -135. See, FAC 132. Plaintiffs attempt to argue that the statute itself does not specifically <br />require exhaustion of remedies on its face. Response Brief at 5 — 6. In Colorado that is an <br />irrelevant argument because exhaustion is a constitutional requirement arising from separation of <br />powers and governed by the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act and judge -made law, as <br />shown in the previous section and Opening Brief. <br />City of Boulder and City of Aspen both rejected contentions identical to those of <br />plaintiffs' with specific reference to a statutory citizen suit cause of action. City of Boulder held <br />that CRS § 40- 7- 102(1), under which the plaintiff municipality had filed suit, "creates a private <br />cause of action to compensate with money damages the injury of any person caused by conduct <br />of a regulated utility that violates state law or any PUC order or decision." City of Boulder, 996 <br />P.2d at 206. The parallels to the statute in the instant case are obvious. Notably, the very next <br />section of that statute contains, just like the statute at issue in the instant case, a savings clause: <br />"The provisions of ... this Title shall not have the effect of releasing or waiving any right of <br />action ... which may have arisen or accrued under any law of this state." CRS § 40 -7- 103(1). <br />Analyzing that statute, the Court of Appeals held that "[t]he plain language of the statute grants <br />permissive jurisdiction to the courts within the state to decide such claims, but [it] cannot fairly <br />be construed as granting exclusive jurisdiction to those courts or as creating subject matter <br />7 <br />