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<br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />The question to resolve with respect to the Compact is <br /> <br />whether Metropolitan, in executing the Energy Contract, took the <br /> <br />risk that its rights to receive such energy were subject to the <br /> <br />specific terms of any legislation which Congress might subsequently <br /> <br />enact to implement the broad purposes expressed in Article I of the <br /> <br />Compact. Metropolitan contends that incorporation of the Compact <br /> <br />does not have that effect. <br /> <br />It is one thing for the Secretary to s tore the wa ter <br /> <br />in the Colorado River Storage Project reservoirs pursuant to the <br /> <br />mandate of Congress expressed in Section 602 (a) of P ,L 90-537, but <br /> <br />it is another to charge Metropolitan as a party to a 1941 contract, <br /> <br />whether Upper Basin reservoirs were not even in existence, with <br /> <br />intentionally accepting the risk of the terms of any legislation <br /> <br />Congress might enact 27 years later which would operate to excuse <br /> <br />the United States from delivering electric energy to Metropolitan <br /> <br />under the Energy Contract. It is unrealistic and unreasonable to <br /> <br />conclude that when Metropolitan's representatives executed the <br /> <br />Energy Contract in 1941, they intended the language of Article 10 <br /> <br />to mean that Metropolitan's right to delivery of electric energy, <br /> <br />the sale of which would finance a prorata share of the Boulder Canyon <br /> <br />Project, was not only subject to the text of the Compact, but was <br /> <br />also subject to the specific terms of any legislation Congress might <br /> <br />subsequently enact to implement the major purposes and broad ob- <br /> <br />jectives of the Compact. Representatives of public agencies do not <br /> <br />-24- <br />