WSP07871

• File Number: 8271.300
• Description: Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program - General Information and Publications-Reports
• Basin: Colorado Mainstem
• Water Division: 5
• Date: 4/1/1985
• Author: RL Gardners
• Title: Assessing Salinity-Control Programs on the Colorado River
• Water Supply Pro - Doc Type: Publication

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limit to the quest for salinity-control proj-
ects, Cost shares of 15 to 25 percent for
both upstream irrigators and downstream
beneficiaries seem reasonable. A tax on
water exports to cover that 3 percent of
salt loading also is desirable, The federal
government should bear the remainder of
salinity control costs on the grounds that
publicly owned lands contribute as much
as one-half of the total salt load, some
salinity control bendits may be consid.
ered public goods. and the government is
partially responsible for irrigation devel-
opment in the Upper Basin.

Prognosis

Cost sharing may make good economic
and common sense, but actual implemen.
tation of such a plan is highly unlikely,
Considerable resistance would be mounted
by ;'111 the beneficiaries of salinity control
now being subsidizeJ. As Ralph. Johnson
says, "It is clear that economic efficiency
has not been the cominant, or ev~n a highly
important goal in the design of the Col-
orado Basin salinity management pro-
gram. This goal has been subordinated to
the twin goals of political equity and in-
come distribution. ":5
Water users can point to a long tradi-
tion of federal financing for water proj.
ects. Precedents for federal funding of sa-
Unit)! control can be found in the low
effective cost shares established for agri-
cultural water supply projects (19 per-
cent). nonpoint-source water-quality
management (3 percent), and runoff-con-
trol projects (34 percent).6 Various inter-
ests have come to rely on federal solutions
to water problems. solutions that usually
increase the supply of water as well. In
turn, the abundant water supply has con.
tributed to the overwatering of Upper
Basin crops, one of the causes of salinity.
Yet with the alternative being an end
to all federal largesse, the budget deficit
creates pressure for cost sharing that is
more in line with the benefit principle.
Evidence of this' is seen in the action by
Congress last year that raised the regional
share (paid from power revenues) of sa-
linity control from 25 to 30 percent of
costs. In addition, at least 30 percent of
the SCS on-farm salinity-control improve-
ments will be recovered from participat-
ing farmers.
Should economic considerations ever
become a priority, several concrete meas.

~Johnson. Ralph W_, "Legal and Institu-
tional Approaches to Salinity Managcment,"
in Dan Yaron. ed.. Salinity in Irrigation and
Water Rt50urceJ (New York, Marcel Dekker,
1981) pp, 305-324,
6Norlh, Ronald M., and Walter P. Neelv.
.. A Model for Achicving Consistency for Cost
Sharing in Walcr Resource Progr:lms." Wattr
RtJouru5 Bulle/in vol. 13. no. 5 (October) {sin,
pp, 995-1005,

)

ures can be employed to get more bang
from the federal buck invested in salinity
control. First. only those projects for which
the present value of benefits exceeds costS
should be undertaken, Hydrologic re-
search and modeling efforts repeatedly
have reduced the dimensions of the salin-
ity problem and the potential benefits of
control. Constructing the five efficient
projects cited above would provide some
reduction in salinity while offering an op-
portunity to advance on the learning CUIVe
of project design, but postponing the re-,
maining projects would avoid irreversible
commitments of funds to nonproductive
social investments. '
Each element of USDA-SCS on-farm
programs should be scrutinized. Less pro.
ductive measures, such as mainline canal
lining, often are added to gain farmer ap-
proval. This local support may be gained
at less cost by the innovative use of eco-
nomic incentives. Similarly. cost-sharing
and irrigation~management programs
should be extended to residential areas,
which may be among [he worst culpri(s
for deep percolation and salt discharge
per acre. An education program for res.
iden(ial water users about evapotranspi-
ration needs and irrigation concepts should
be a very cost-effective salinity control
measure.
Finally, (here is the opportunity for in-
creased efficiency and fairness through (he
choice of cos(.sharing mechanisms and
economic incentives. The greatest gain
probably would come from establishing a
well-defined water market. Market prices
eventually would reflect. both the value of
water saved and salt removed, creating a
strong incenrive to conserve irrigation
warer. This is rantamounr to the conser-
vation subsidies discussed earlier. Of
course, legal and institu(ional obstacles to
water markets first must be surmounted.
The means of cost sharing should be
more thoroughly considered in all areas
of public investment. The returns to in-
vestments in salinity control have been
affected substantially by haphazard and
implici( decisions made in the" political
process, If today.s policymakers would
explicitly consider equity impacts and
eliminate unintended subsidies. they could
increase both the efficiency of public proj~
ects and fairness among those most af-
fected by salinity in the Colorado River.

Author Richard L. Gardner, an economisl
in the Execulive Office of lhe Governor,
State of Idaho, Boise. was a /982 recipienr
of an REF Food and Agricu/rura/ Policy
Disserlation Fellowship. It is this research
upon which lhe current article is based.
Coauthor Roberl A. Young is a professor
in the Depanmem of Agricullural and Nat-
ural Resource Economics, Colorado Slale
University, Fori Collins.

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