<br />00113S
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<br />1957]
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<br />THE PELTON DECISION
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<br />251
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<br />The essence of the decision, as of the license, is the power of the
<br />commission to issue, regardless of state law, an administrative fiat based
<br />on the proposition that the government, as owner of Federal reserved
<br />lands, may require that a given quantity of water shall run through its
<br />lands. This is, of course, not stated-at least not in these terms. Mani-
<br />festly, it seems, it is the gist of the decision, for the government ob-
<br />viously is not an appropriator. Its only possible theory is that of a
<br />riparian proprietor who has never surrendered any part of his riparian
<br />right. The defiance of property rights acquired through a system of ap-
<br />propriation has been perceived neither by the majority of the court
<br />nor by a writer on the subjectIoo. Neither Justice Burton nor Mr.
<br />Schwartz, the writer referred to, even mentions the law of appropria-
<br />tion. The latter pays his respects to western water laws by referring to
<br />"water law" as "a shibboleth-ridden, metaphysical, almost religious
<br />field."lol It might be replied that, as a shibboleth, the law of appropria-
<br />tion has dominated an area covering more than half the continental
<br />United States and is probably the greatest single factor in the develop-
<br />ment of the agricultural economy of the region between the 98th merid-
<br />ian (bisecting Nebraska) and the Pacific Ocean.102
<br />As a final thought, the writer would hesitate to venture the conclu-
<br />sion that the decision should be blamed either on ignorance or mis-
<br />construction of the law. Rather, it seems that the court, as it has many
<br />times, especially in recent years, has sought to assert in what it may
<br />deem a field of some confusion the superiority of the Federal govern-
<br />ment. It may well conceive its function may encompass the implement-
<br />ing of the too-cautious steps of Congress in vindicating the national
<br />power. Certainly, the court may well be on firm ground in asserting
<br />national claims to lands under the marginal sea. If such lands may be
<br />said to be susceptible of any ownership, such ownership is an attribute
<br />of national, not state or territorial, sovereigntyI03 But it is one thing to
<br />recognize the amorphous quality of property rights in lands under the
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<br />out. Also provided for is future development under the Federal reclamation laws,
<br />but this development is limited by the license. For example, additional appropria-
<br />tions on Lake Creek are limited to 20,000 acre-feet annually; on Squaw Creek,
<br />the limitation is to "all flows during the irrigation season"; on Crooked River
<br />below the Highway bridge, no more than 2,500 acre-feet may be taken annually
<br />for the Deschutes project. In the Matter of Portland General Company, Project
<br />No. 2030, Federal Power Commission Order of December 18, 1951.
<br />100 Schwartz, Federalism a"d A"adromolls Fish, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 535
<br />(1955).
<br />101Id. at 537.
<br />1O::! Only a minor part of the development has been under the Reclamation Act,
<br />but, under that act alone, the government has constructed fifty-eight projects,
<br />irrigating some 5,000,000 acres. Gross crop value on this land was estimated at
<br />a half billion dollars in 1947. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MAN-
<br />UAL-1949, p. 231.
<br />103 Munro, The Supreme Court and Ihe Marginal Sea, 4 WYo. L.J. 181 (1950).
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