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0011 n , 1957] THE PELTON DECISION 235 agricultural purposes, <!- substantial part of the economy was preserved. (4) Boquillas Land and Cattle Company v, Curtis,51 The corporation plaintiff owned a tract through which the San Pedro River ran for some fourteen miles. Claiming as riparian owner on the basis of a grant from the Mexican state of Sonora in 1833, plaintiff sought to enjoin defend- ants from rebuilding a dam in said river for the purpose of diverting water for irrigation. Plaintiff had irrigable land, but had previously not attempted to divert any of the waters for such use. Hence, plaintiff claimed solely under riparian righL Conceding that the Arizona terri- torial legislature had abolished riparian rights, plaintiff said that the original Mexican grant included such right. Holmes held, however, that in the state of Sonora appropriation was the custom in 1833, Further- more, he held, contrary to the contention of plaintiff, that the patent issued to plaintiff pursuant to the Federal statute of March 3, 1891 was a "confirmation" of the existing title and did not enlarge the previous granL The lower court had held for defendants on the strength of the 1877 act, thus supporting the Hough v. Porter view. Commenting on the Oregon case, Holmes said: The opinion that we have expressed makes it unnecessary to decide whether lands in the arid regions patented after the act of March 3, 1877. . ,are not accepted subject to the rule that priority of appropriation gives priority of right by virtue of that act construed with Rev, Stat., section 2339, The Supreme Court of Oregon has rmdered a decision to that effect on plausibte grounds. Hough v, Porter, 98 Pac. Rep. 1083.52 In summary of the cases cited so far, what inferences may be adopted, tentatively at least? These are suggested: (1) Congress made clear by the acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877 that local customs and usages should govern with respect to the acquisition and recognition of water rights appurtenant or which might be made appurtenant to lands acquired under the homestead and other acts; (2) grantees of the government took subject to any accrued and vested rights to water as recognized by local custom; (3) a conveyance or grant of land by the government did not carry with it ex' proprio vigore any rights to water, but water rights, if any, would be recognized only under the local law of the jurisdiction; (4) the act of 1877, if the view of the Oregon court and United States Supreme Court is to be accepted, limited riparian rights on land entries made subsequent to the act to domestic uses (water for man and beast), with the result that the principal beneficial uses-mining, manufactur- ing (which would include electric-power generation), and agriculture -were controlled by the law of appropriation, Also, it must be noted, the right to maintain water for navigation was not to be abridged, and some question without doubt remained, particularly in view of the Rio 51213 V,S. 339 (1909), 52 I d, at 344, (Emphasis added.)