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<br />suggests that a landowner's proprietary interest <br />in groundwater is limited to the amount which <br />can be put to reasonable and beneficial use on <br />the overlying land. The language of Olson and <br />Luchsinger suggests that groundwater supplies <br />can be apportioned when supplies are insuffi- <br />cient to meet all needs. The issue is complicated <br />by the existence of Nebraska's groundwater <br />preference statute which places agricultural <br />uses above industrial uses.19 What constitutes a <br />reasonable and beneficial use on the overlying <br />land? Presurnably the definition and limitation of <br />such terms would be within the power of the <br />legislature as the following language from the <br />dissent suggests: "The water rights here at- <br />tempted to be condemned will be owned, main- <br />tained, and operated by the municipality. The <br />state has declared water to be a public use and <br />its control is entirely in the hands of the <br />legislature,,20 (emphasis added). This language <br />suggests a very flexible approach to ground- <br />water property rights, at least by a portion of the <br />court in 1967. <br /> <br />5. Prather v. Eisemann21 (1978) <br /> <br />Prather was an action brought by plaintiff <br />domestic well owners to enjoin pumping by <br />defendant irrigators. Plaintiff alleged that de- <br />fendant's pumping caused a loss of artesian <br />pressure in their wells, thereby interfering with <br />their domestic consumption. The court held the <br />irrigator liable for the costs of replacing the <br />domestic users' wells. Although the case was <br />decided on an interpretation of Nebraska's <br />groundwater preference statute (arguably an in- <br />correct interpretation since the court failed to <br />distinguish between rights to the groundwater <br />itself and rights to the means of diversion), the <br />court took the opportunity to extensively review <br />the Nebraska law of groundwater rights. <br />The court began by reiterating the Nebraska <br />Rule of Reasonable Use first announced in Olson <br />and approved in Luchsinger. The court stressed <br />that omission of the "sharing" language in <br />Metropolitan Utilities was not significant since <br />proportional use was not at issue in that case. <br />Consequently," Nebraska, in Olson, adopted the <br />rule of reasonable use with the addition of the <br />California doctrine of apportionment in time of <br />shortage."22 <br />Plaintiffs argued that runoff from defendant's <br />lands indicated that water in excess of a reason- <br />able and beneficial use was being applied. The <br />court did not reach the issue of how a reasonable <br />and beneficial use on overlying land was to be <br />determined although it did discuss the meaning <br />of reasonable use under three competing <br />doctrines, the American, California, and Restate- <br /> <br />1-4 <br /> <br />ment Rules. According to the court, reasonable <br />use is defined in relation to the appropriator's <br />land in American Rule jurisdictions, is defined as <br />a reasonable share of the whole in correlative <br />rights jurisdictions, and is defined by balancing <br />the equities among competing users in Restate- <br />ment jurisdictions. By implication, reasonable <br />use under the Nebraska Rule would seem to be a <br />reasonable share of the whole not to exceed <br />what can be reasonably and beneficially applied <br />to the appropriator's lands. The court speaks of <br />this as an "equal right to a fair share" of the <br />underground water.23 <br />The "equal right to a fair share" applies only <br />among users of the same preference class, how- <br />ever. When competing uses in different pre- <br />ference classes are involved, the court favors the <br />preferred use although its reasoning is far from <br />clear. Onthe one hand, the court may be saying <br />that the preference statute entitles preferred <br />users to a property right in water tables and <br />artesian head undiminished by the pumping <br />operations of less preferred users. Although <br />such a conclusion would be consistent with the <br />court's holding in Prather, it is possible that the <br />court intended to create a property right in the <br />"reasonable maintenance of water levels and <br />artesian head" with reasonable derived from the <br />rule of nonliability for use of groundwater <br />enunciated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF <br />TORTS.24 <br />The court quotes from an earlier draft of what is <br />now RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS <br />9856(1 )(a). This section provides for liability if a <br />withdrawal of groundwater "unreasonably" <br />causes harm to a proprietor of neighboring land <br />through lowering the water table or reducing <br />artesian pressure. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) <br />OF TORTS 9850A provides that determining <br />"reasonableness" involves a consideration of <br />many factors including: <br />a) the purpose of use <br />b) the suitability of use <br />c) the economic value of use <br />d) the social value of use <br />e) the extent and amount of harm <br />caused <br />f) the practicality of avoiding the <br />harm by adjusting the use or <br />method of use of one proprietor or <br />the other <br />g) the practicality of adjusting th~ <br />quantity of water used by each <br />proprietor <br />h) the protection of existing values of <br />water uses, land, investments and <br />enterprises, and <br />i) the justice of requiring the user <br />causing harm to bear the loss. <br />