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4 -0060 in directing the use or disposition of water by federal agencies, there is no question that, b 0 eration of the ) ~ Supremacy Cause, suc a s ec~fic directive reem ts incon- s~s en state laws. See discussion at pp. 47-51 infra. As we discuss below, a legal basis may therefore exist under particular federal statutes for assertion of federal water rights that do not fall into the category of either reserved or state-recognized rights, and that might conceivably be classified as "non-reserved" water rights simply because they do not stem from the reserved doctrine. This is not to say, however, that an a ro riate 1 al basis ex~s s or e rv i hts theor , as ~ as been articulated b , among others former olicjtor Leo Kru ~tz 0 the Departmpnt of thp Interior. It is this theo~ that we address here. In his June 25, 1979, opinion on the legal bases for acquisition of water rights by the Department of the Interior, Solicitor Krulitz concluded that, in the absence of an explicit congressional directive to the contrary, a federal agency may claim and use whatever unappropriated water is necessary to carry out congressionally authorized "management programs" for federal lands, without regard to state law. See pp. 40-44 infra. ~olicitor Krulitz's theory of federal non-reserved water riqhts rested on the presumpt~on that the ~ federal government need not comply with state water law in its ac u~s~~~on ana use of water for feder federa lands -- a presumption that could be rebutted only by an explicit statutory directive that the federal agency respons~ble for management of the federal lands in question ab~de by state law in the use, appropriation or distribution Of water on those lands. Thus, under this theory, in the absence of such a directive a federal agency may use whatever unappropriated water is necessary to carry out its land management functions without regard to state law. !I We conclude that the broad federal non-reserved water rights theory asserted by Solicitor Krulitz is not supported by an analysis of the applicable statutes and judicial decisions. As we discuss below, to the extent Solicitor Krulitz relies on federal ownership of unappropriated water in the western states as a basis for federal rights to water, that il As we discuss at p. 43 infra, Solicitor Krulitz concluded that federal agencies are immune from both substantive and procedural state law, but recommended as a matter of policy that the agencies comply with state procedures wherever possible. -4-