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0108 Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra, 426 U.S. at 539-40; Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1918). Therefore, if the United States .owns" the water, it may be contended that all that is necessary to perfect its rights is use of that water for an authorized federal purpose; a state cannot impose any restrictions on that use unless Congress has explicitly granted an ownership interest to the states. See Comment, "Federal Non-Reserved Water Rights," 15 Land and Water L. Rev. 67, 76 (1980). At the same time, the ownership theory provides a basis for the states' argument that statehood acts and the federal land acts passed in the 1860's and 1870's (see pp. 18-21 supra) constituted an express grant of ownership to~e states of all unappropriated water within their borders, and that there- fore they may now exercise plenary authority over that water. ~/ If the states own that unappropriated water, the only way 82/ Aside from the effect of the Mining Acts of 1866 and 1870 and the Desert Land Act, the western states have also asserted other theories to support claims of ownership in unappropriated waters within their borders, viz, (1) in the original thirteen (riparian) states, the federar-government had no interes~ in water as a sovereign and, therefore, under the constitutional equal footing doctrine, which guaranteed admission to the western states on an "equal footing" with the original thirteen states, the federal government relinquished all claims to water within the new states; or (2) Congress by the various acts of admission impliedly accepted or ratified state constitutional and statutory provisions asserting the ownership of water. Neither theory provides an adequate or consistent basis for state claims of ownership of unappropriated water. Although in California v. United States, supra, 438 U.S. at 654, the Court noted, without elaboration, that "[olne school of legal commentators held the view that, under the equal-footing doctrine, the Western States, upon their admission to the Union, acquired exclusive sovereignty over the unappropriated waters in their streams," the Court's interpretation of the equal footing doctrine in other cases has been limited. In enera , the Court has interpreted the doctrine to apply only to political rights of sovereignty granted the original states, not to property or economic rights. See, ~.~., United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950). In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963), the Court rejected the contention that the equal footing doctrine could limit "the broad powers of the United States to regulate navigable waters under the Commerce Clause and to regulate government lands under Art. IV, S 3 of the Constitution." See discussion (Continued) -52- . . < .'