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.. 0087 deny such rights. ~/ - After Cappaert and New Mexico, it is safe to conclude that a federal agency may acquire unappropriated water on federal lands without regard to state substantive or procedural law, when that land has been reserved pursuant to congressional authorization for a specific federal purpose that requires the use of water. The right is based on implied congressional intent, and is limited in two crucial respects. First, federal rights will be implied only if necessary to accomplish the specific purposes for which Congress authorized reservation of the land, not for incidental, or "secondary" uses that may be permitted by congressional authorization or acquiescence in agency practice. Drawing the line between the "primary purposes" for which water may be reserved and the "secondary uses" for which water may not be reserved requires a careful examination of congressional intent, as expressed in the particular statute authorizing reservation and management of the land in question and its legislative history. Second, the amount of water reserved is only that minimally necessary to accomplish those primary purposes ~- i.e., that water "without [which] the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated." united States v. New Mexico, supra, 438 U.S. at 700. b. Conflicts with congressional directives In the second relevant line of decisions, the Court has held that a state may not veto a federally authorized water project by requiring the federal government or its licensee to obtain a state permit authorizing use of water necessary for the project, and may not impose conditions on the acquisition, use, or distribution of project water that are inconsistent with specific congressional directives authorizing the project. Although in these cases the Court has not developed 49/ New Mex1co was a split decision, with Justices Brennan, wnite, and Marshall joining in a dissent written by Justice Powell. The dissenters, however, did not take issue with the conclusion of the majority that Congress had generally deferred to state water law and therefore "that the implied- reservation doctrine should be applied with sensitivity to its impact upon those who have obtained water rights under state law and to Congress' general policy of deference to state law," and concurred in the majority's conclusion that the organic Administration Act could not be read "as evidencing an intent to reserve water for recreational or stockwatering purposes." 438 u.S. at 7l8. The dissenters disagreed rather with the majority's narrow reading of the legislative history of the Organic Administration Act to exclude preser- vation of wildlife as a primary purpose of the reservation of national forests. ld. at 719. - 31 -