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, 0082 continued flow of its waters, so far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial. uses of the government property: second, that it is limited by the superior power of the general government to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits of the united States. 174 U.S. at 703. The Court's holding rested only on the second limitation -- i.e., the federal government's superior authority under the Commerce Clause to preserve the navigability of the stream. .!il Nine years later, in winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 565 (1908), the Court relied, ~nter alla, on the first limit- ation described in Rio Grande -- the-rnability of the state to destroy the federal government's rights to the continued flow of a stream "at least, as may be necessary for beneficial uses of government property" -- to support implication of a so-called "reserved" right to water under a treaty between the federal government and the Indians of the Fort Berthold Reservation. The treaty set aside particular tracts of the public domain as a homeland for the Indians, but did not expressly provide for the water necessary to irrigate that land. The Court found nonetheless that the treaty and reservation of land impliedly set aside sufficient water for the present and future needs of the Indians, reasoning that Congress' intent that the Indians become a pastoral and civilized people could not be accomplished without sufficient water to irrigate the reservation land. 207 U.S. at 576. Citing Rio Grande, the Court opined that, "[t]he power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be." Id. at 577. Until 1955, the Winters, or reserved right doctrine, was generally thought to be a special rule of Indian law, rather than a general rule applicable to all federal reserva- tions. See F. Trelease, "Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC," 54Denver L. J. 473, 475 (1977). In 1955, the Supreme Court suggested for the first time that other types of federal reservations might also provide a basis for federal reserved rights. In Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955), often referred to as the pelton Dam decision, 441 Nearly seventy years later, the Supreme Court stated that tne holding in Rio Grande was limited, and to be construed as reaffirming the rights of the states over disposition and use of water except in narrow and specific circumstances. "[E]xcept where the reserved rights or navigation servitude of the United States are invoked, the State has total authorit over its internal waters." Ca ~ orn~a v. Un~te States, supra, 438 U.S. at 662 (emphas~s added). See discuss~on at pp. 66-67, infra. - 26 -