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<br />, <br /> <br />0377 <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />rather than identifying the extent of the Secretary's authori~y <br />to implement the IO's recommendations. Given the substantial <br />amount of gray area that exists in Reclamation law, the <br />prevailing attitude toward the exercise of Secretarial <br />discretion has meant that substantially fewer real dollars will <br />be l."eturned to the Treasury from local water and power users. <br />(See Chapters 4. 7. and 8.) <br /> <br />5. Too often. the Bureau of Reclamation has negotiated <br />contracts with local water users that fail to fully protect the <br />Federal taxpayer's interest. .fuether by inadvertence. <br />miscalculation. or design. the regional BuRec officials <br />entrusted with securing contractual commitments to repay the <br />costs of Reclamation projects have come up short on numerous <br />occasions. Those offices and officials who stand to benefit <br />most in terms of budget and personnel resulting from major <br />construction projects apparently have insufficient incentives <br />to insist upon airtight repayment commitments from local <br />interests. (See Chapters 3,5.7,8. and 9.) <br /> <br />6. The refusal of the Department to implement the <br />recommendations of its own Inspector General -- even if <br />reversed immediately -- has already produced a substantial <br />windfall for water and power'users. The Treasury has had to <br />borrow funds at interest rates of 7% to 14% during the past <br />eight years, and private sector borrowing costs have been even <br />higher. Meanwhile the water and power customers of the <br />projects covered by the IG audits have been charged interest <br />rates of 3-1/2% or less on balances owed to the ~reasury. <br />Under such conditions. any deferral of repayment by local <br />interests greatly increases the value of their interest <br />subsidy. (See Chapters 3. 4. 5. 6. and 9.) <br /> <br />7. The repayment status of more than $5.6 billion in existing <br />and proposed Federal investment in Reclamation prolects remains <br />unaudited. with the attendant possibilities of waste, <br />inefficiency, and abuse of fiscal and natural resources. <br />Notwithstanding the unbusinesslike practices that mark the <br />repayment status of the six projects audited to date. the <br />Office of the Inspector General has simply stopped looking for <br />similar instances of repayment mismanagement in other <br />Reclamation project accounts. Under the Reagan Administration, <br />the IG has diverted his audit resources -- both relatively and <br />absolutely -- away from audit activities with the potential for <br />increasing cost recovery from water and power users. (See <br />Chapter 1.) <br /> <br />8. The Office of the Inspector General has failed to provide <br />vigorous follow-up on its audit recommendations. Some <br />Reclamation project audits were closed out. i.e., considered <br />resolved, without any record of decision by the Inspector <br />General. In other instances, audits were resolved on the basis <br /> <br />11 <br />