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<br />.!:'J <br />?~I <br /> <br />i-l <br />~J <br /> <br />The Economic Setting <br /> <br />-': <br /> <br />green pastures in the desert would demand less ofthem if they bore the full <br />cost, as would advocates of protecting the intrinsic value of river-related <br />resources. <br /> <br />""; <br />:-.-' <br /> <br />When there is competition for resources, of course, a federal policy or action <br />that creates incentives for one competitor generally creates an offsetting <br />disincentive for another. In particular, as these policies and actions <br />traditionally have encouraged irrigators and urban consumers to use more <br />water, they have reduced the water available for those with a preference for <br />the goods and services derived from instream flows and a natural ecosystem. <br />More recently, as federal policies and actions increase the likelihood that <br />those preferring protection for endangered species and the ecosystem will <br />have their preferences satisfied, they often do so at the expense of <br />consumptive users, especially farmers, who account for most water <br />consumption in the Basin. Given the complex set of goods and services <br />derived from the Basin's natural resources, the growing competition for <br />them, and the pervasive federal influence on the competition, any decision <br />regarding these resources affects the composition of incentives and <br />disincentives affecting the different competitors. <br /> <br />;.;:.; <br /> <br />: :'.~ <br /> <br />:"~, <br />,~ <br /> <br />The market distortions from federal policies and actions trigger all sorts of <br />responses by competitors for the Basin's water and related resources: <br />understandably, those who benefit from a particular policy or action try to <br />protect it, while those who don't benefit try to have it reversed or to strike a <br />deal with the beneficiaries. In theory, it is possible for the different groups <br />to compete among themselves and find ways for resources to move from <br />low-value uses to high-value ones. To some extent, such maneuvering <br />occurs. This past year, for example, saw extraordinary efforts to avoid <br />potential environmental disasters by increasing instream flows in southern <br />Colorado and the Middle Rio Grande Valley with water that otherwise would <br />have been used or reserved for consumptive use. By and large, however, the <br />existing economic, legal, and resource-management institutions are sluggish <br />and considerable resources remain in low-value uses. <br /> <br />. ~ <br /> <br />". <br />~. ' <br /> <br />'~;; <br /> <br />D. Summary <br /> <br />The Upper Rio Grande Basin is home to a complex set of interrelated <br />physical resources. Powerful economic forces drive the competition for these <br />resources. Traditional or early economic forces imposed limited and simple <br />competitive pressures on the resources: water was extracted for agricultural <br />production and the needs of small settlements. Over time, however, the <br /> <br />. {lJf'4"" <br />t.v"''' 0 <br /> <br />6S <br />