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0231 . . ownership and control of the land within the scope of its delegated functions under the war power, it enjoyed a superior position under the supremacy clause and state laws heed not be observed. It must first be noted that the court was not dealing with federal claims to water rights as against private users, and considered the supremacy clause dispositive of the issue before the court. Secondly, the Ninth Circuit Court on appeal directed that the case be dismissed because the district court was without jurisdiction. 63/ Shamberger thus has little or no value as a precedent in support of the Opinion's assertion of non-reserved water rights, Kleppe v. New Mexico 64/ was also not a water rights case. The Court held that the federal wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act preempts enforcement of the New Mexico's estray law. A three-judge court had held that the Wild Horses Act was unconstitutional, because it was in excess of Congress' power under the property clause. The Supreme Court reversed, The Court noted the detailed findings which Congress had made on the need to protect wild horses and burros as an integral part of the public lands. In re- viewing Congressional intent, the Court noted that "while courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the property clause are entrusted primarily to the judgement of Congress." 65/ Thus, while the case makes it clear that the property clause gives Congress the authority to enact legislation protecting federal property, it does not sustain similar prerogatives on the p~rt of an administrative agency in the absence of explicit congressional directions. Congress has not passed a statute similar to the wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act which directs Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to manage waters appurtinent to federally owned lands as "components of the public lands." Absent such action by Congress, or a similar expression of intent, the reasoning used in Kleppe simply cannot support a general federal agency right to appropriate water for management objectives. Kleppe is particularly inappropriate where congressional intent has been declared to be that federal agencies will comply with state law for the ac- quisit~on of water rights, with the exception of the reser- vation doctrine and the navigation servitude. 63/ 279 F. 2d 699 (9th cir. 1960). ~/ 426 U.S. 529 (1976). ~/ Id, at 536. -17-