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<br />OClI0S8 <br /> <br />should anyone benefit from water that they do not put to a beneficial use? But it impedes <br />efficient conservation. <br /> <br />(2) Below-<Joportunitv-cost orices for water: Most districts and farmers pay nowhere near <br /> <br />the opportunity cost of water. Thus, they do not have the incentive to conserve water that <br />would be socially cost-effective to conserve. <br /> <br />(3) Insufficient financial resources: Most districts and farmers cannot afford t~ <br /> <br />implement some of the more expensive conservation measures, such as ditch-lining, drip <br /> <br />irrigation etc. <br /> <br />(4) Resistance to transfer-deoendent conservation: Most districts; reflecting the <br /> <br /> <br />"instit~tional. resistance of their farmers to transfers of water to m&i use outside of district <br /> <br /> <br />boundaries, are loathe to approve these transfers, thereby discouraging conservation measures. <br /> <br /> <br />In states, like California, where district boards are powerful, this can be the death knell for <br /> <br /> <br />interest in conservation. <br /> <br />(5) Bureau concerns: For some projects, in particular the Central Valley Project (CVP), <br /> <br /> <br />the bureau is an impediment to conservation. Notwithstanding California law which promotes <br /> <br /> <br />agricultural water conservation and transfers, regional bureau policy still (at least as of March, <br /> <br /> <br />1991) discourages conservation at almost every turn. For example, conservation to the bureau <br /> <br /> <br />may lead to a drawing down of contract entitlements at contract renewal time. The bureau so <br /> <br /> <br />far frowns on transfers of conserved water, except on an annual basis, between agricultural <br /> <br />23 <br />