WSP05341 - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Operate the Desalting Plant and, after the interim period, purchase alternative sources of water to meet the 1944 Treaty deliveries; and (E) Operate the Desalting Plant at full-scale capacity. The alternatives recover or replace 78,500 af per year and assume that WHIDD drainage will be reduced to 132,000 af per year or less. The estimated annual costs do not include any costs for acquiring water to replace the remaining 53,500 af per year of bypass. A brief summary of the sub-options considered under each alternative follow. ALTERNATIVE AI: Shutdown Desalting Plant. Under this alternative, the Desalting Plant would be disassembled. The Desalting Plant would be locked up and not maintained, however a portion of the facility would continue to be used for the Yuma Projects Office. The primary advantage of shutting down the Desalting Plant is the low annual operating cost of $3.7 million for the first year, and $1.3 million per year thereafter as shown in Table A. The $1.3 million per year would provide for necessary operating costs related to the Yuma Projects Office, and for maintaining the bypass canal. The time and costs for restarting the Desalting Plant in the future, (about 6 years and $70 million) would likely be prohibitive, making this form of non-operation a permanent decision. The water conserved by lining the Coachella Canal, combined with irrigation management improvements, would be used during the interim period to replace the additional water released from storage to meet the delivery obligation to Hexico. After the interim period, the water delivery commitments to Mexico would be met by existing reservoir storage for which the United States may have to acquire a right to use. The estimated $1.3 million annual operating cost does not include any costs for acquiring water. As the Upper Basin has yet to fully develop, overall water supply demands continue to be less than the long-term supply. With the large carryover storage of the Colorado River reservoirs, the probability that shortages will occur in the foreseeable future is relatively low, and there is a good probability that the reservoir system will fill and flood control releases will be required. If so, water conserved by operation of the Desalting Plant and reserved in storage may eventually be spilled and may in part be wasted. However, as the time and funding required (6 years and $70 million) for restarting would likely be prohibitive, the United States would be permanently disassembling the mechanism that was recently constructed to fulfill commitments made to the Basin States and placing the burden of risk upon the Basin States for meeting the provisions of Minute No. 242. This alternative would be a major departure from past commitments and would undoubtedly be met by strong opposition from the Basin States and Mexico, in that it would not result in the envisioned "permanent, definitive and just solution" to the salinity issue. Mexico would also likely object in that it may result in fewer scheduled deliveries of surplus water as provided for in Article 15 of the 1944 Treaty. Absent any permanent solution, the Basin States would not likely cooperate in providing water that would have to be acquired. This alternative would also appear illogical in view of recent activities to complete construction and begin operation of the Desalting Plant. . iv