WSP05341

• File Number: 8278.100
• Description: Title I - Yuma Desalting Plant
• Basin: Colorado Mainstem
• Date: 12/23/1992
• Author: USDOI/BOR
• Title: Yuma Desalting Plant - Alternatives for the Interim Period
• Water Supply Pro - Doc Type: Publication

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would be realized. This includes the potential value of reducing the
Nation's costs in meeting requirements of the Clean Water Act, the Safe
Drinking Water Act, reuse, hazardous waste management clean up, and in
augmenting water supplies.

CONS:

Restarting Costly Though Not Prohibitive

After having recently completed construction and initiated operation
under this alternative, the Desalting Plant would now be deactivated and
preserved. Start-up would cost about $18 million and take about 3 years
to purchase and manufacture new membranes.

Opposition From Basin States

The opposition by the Basin States and Mexico would be similar to AI,
though not as strong. Their arguments would focus on:

Intent of the Congress

The Basin States would argue that Congress authorized and appropriated
funds for construction consistent with the authorizing Act so as not to
diminish water appropriated to the Basin States in meeting Article 15 of
the 1944 Treaty obligations to Mexico and that Congress intended for the
Desalting Plant to be operated once construction was completed for
conservation of the water of the Basin States.

Interim Period Presumed To Continue For More Than 4 Years

As restarting the Desalting Plant would be expensive, the United States
would be committing to not operating the Desalting Plant for at least
4 years.

Reduced Surplus Opportunities

The continued loss of system storage caused by not reducing the bypass
flows may marginally reduce the likelihood of surplus opportunities
being available for diversion by the Basin States. Mexico would also
likely object in that it may result in less scheduled deliveries of
surplus water as provided for in the 1944 Treaty.

Basin States Would Assume Risk Of Injury

The United States would be committing to not conserving WMIDD drainage
for several years and placing the burden of risk upon the Basin States
for meeting the provisions of Minute No. 242. As the United States
would not be following through with operation of the Desalting Plant and
allowing the resulting draw on system storage to continue, thi~ would be
somewhat of a departure from past commitments and would be met by
opposition from the Basin States and Mexico. The United States would be
delaying a full commitment to implementing the envisioned "permanent,
definitive, and just solution" to the salinity issue.

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