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I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Reduced Surplus Opportunities The continued loss of system storage caused by not reducing the bypass flows may marginally reduce the likelihood of surplus opportunities being available for diversion by the Basin States. Mexico would also likely object in that it may result in less scheduled deliveries of surplus water as provided for in Article 15 of the 1944 Treaty. Basin States Would Assume Risk Of Injury As the time and funding required (6 years and $70 million) for restarting would likely be prohibitive, the United States would be permanently disassembling the mechanism that was recently constructed to fulfill commitments made to the Basin States and placing the burden of risk upon the Basin States for meeting the provisions of Minute No. 242. This would be a major departure from past commitments and would undoubtedly be met by strong opposition from the Basin States and Mexico, in that it would not result in the envisioned "permanent, definitive and just solution" to the salinity issue. The United States would, in effect, be stating that it has no intention of ever desalting the WMIDD drainage and operating the Desalting Plant to reduce the loss of bypassed irrigation drainage and the resulting draw on system storage. As has been stated, the 1944 Treaty did not address water quality. The United. States, as a matter of international comity, gave recognition to Mexico's claim on the quality of Colorado River. water delivered to Mexico. Throughout the period of negotiations with Mexico leading to Minute No. 242, Mr. Brownell assured the Basin States that no water user within the seven Basin States suffered any injury by reason of the negotiation or implementation of Minute No. 242. Brownell noted that the 1974 Act was intended to solve the salinity problem by spending money and, limiting to a practical minimum, the loss of Basin State water. The 1974 Act was viewed as the vehicle for ensuring the Basin States from risk of injury. For a more detailed account of the Basin States interpretation, see "The Brownell Task Force And The Mexican Salinity Problem: A Narrative Chronology of Events, September 1991" by Anne DeMarsay. The provisions of Minute No. 242 could not be implemented until Congress authorized the construction and operation of the Desalting Plant and the lining of the Coachella Canal. Should the United States.disassemble the Desalting Plant and not follow through with its commitments to the Basin States, the Basin States could attempt legal action to stop the loss of their water supplies and challenge the continuance of the United States exceeding the 1944 Treaty requirements by delivering to Mexico an additional 132,000 af per year of Basin State water in order tQ avoid desalting WMIDD return flow. 21