WSP04958 - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I t i I I I I 43 frankly," Swing stated, "your telegram simply insures Arizona continuing to assume the attitude of cock of the walk or dog in the manger -- an unreasonable attitude which has prevented and is preventing an agreement."127 But Carpenter was unphased by Swing's comments. California's determination to force construction on the river prior to making peace with Arizona and prior to signing a Compact without reservations so offended him that he rededicated himself to defeat of the Swing-Johnson BilI, politically moving against sentiment which was then building in Congress to pass this legislation in some form. Carpenter's tactic was to reemphasize the protection factor that would be available to the Upper Basin only in a seven-state compact. Shortly after hearing from Senator Swing, Carpenter admitted that the Upper Basin had "never been satisfied with the six-state proceeding but simply consented to it as the lesser of two evils," that is, having no Compact at all or a Compact that alIowed for minimal protection from Arizona. FolIowing Utah's repeal of the six-state compact, the Upper Basin had to change its tactics, respecting Utah's sovereign right to proceed according to its own needs and following the only course which would fulIy honor the principles agreed to in Santa Fe in 1922: a seven-state compact. To proceed on a five-state basis without Utah, Carpenter noted, "would be ridiculous and to assume that we are not to take Utah seriously and to proceed on the theory of an ultimate six-state basis is not only insulting to Utah but amounts to deluding ourselves.',128 By the end of 1927, Carpenter was urging Colorado's congressional delegation to stand firm on a seven-state compact. He told Hoover that the Upper Basin was prepared to insist on seven-state ratification regardless of California's plea for immediate approval of the Swing-Johnson Bill.129 Colorado Senator Lawrence Phipps joined others in urging Carpenter to