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<br />private power companies and advocates of public power shifted with
<br />the passage of Ihe Rural F..Iectrification Act and the Bonneville Power
<br />Act to whelher the governme11l should build transmission lines instead
<br />of relying on private transmission facilitie" and whether it would con-
<br />struct ,team P'l\\W plants to slIpplement hydroeleclric pO\o.er. The
<br />Flood Conlrol An ()f 1944, 58 Still. 890, Iii U.5.C. 825s, authorized the
<br />Secretary of the Interior hlJlh to transmit and ,ell surplus power, giving
<br />preference in th.' sale of Ihe power to public bodies and cooperatives. In
<br />1 941i, the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, issued a Memoran-
<br />dUln of Poli.:y ordering tile wnslruction or sleam generating plants;
<br />authori/ing the construction of transmission lines where private utilities
<br />refused 10 transmil power on rcasonable lerms; and initiating a pro-
<br />gram of ,k.'iv.c a.s.vislallc<' I() publicly owned utilities and cooperatives.
<br />The Rivers alld Harhllrs AL'I of 1945, 59 Stal. 10, provided for the dis-
<br />trihution III po"er from the Snake River Dams and the Umatilla Darn
<br />In aceordancc with the ,cry liberal preference provisions of the Bonne-
<br />ville Project AL.I. And in 1950, Ihe I:.klutna Project Ael, 64 Stat. 382,48
<br />U.S.c. 312a, and the Icgislati,)n pr,widing for the sale or the Palisades
<br />Dam and American Falls Power Plant in Idaho, 1'.1.. 81-864, 8151
<br />Congo 2d Sess. (1950) both illcludL'd pul,lic power preferences.
<br />Dllring this period investor-m\"iled IIlilities began 10 reform their rate
<br />slrllclure.< alld limil their often enormou> profits as puhlidy owned and
<br />cooperati\ e "tilit)' companics demonstraled Ihroughout the country the
<br />economic hC'll('fil~ ~)f low L'n~t power. In case after ca'ie, in\-'~stor-o\\'ned
<br />utilities, faced wilh either Ihe pro,pect of a compeling publicly owned
<br />utility or L.ooperativc or S\ith the irrefutahle evidence Ihat power could
<br />be generated and tran,milted inexpensively, reduced their rales to more
<br />clo_e1y approximate the ratcs ,charged hy publicly owned utilities and
<br />cooperative,. Argumcnb o,er whether Federal preference power and
<br />the la.,-e.,empr Slat"s of the p"hlidy owned and cooperative systems
<br />gave them unfair advanlagc were biller; hut the fact remained that
<br />power rail'S declined .significantly, and large segments of thc American
<br />public received lo\\-cmt power for Ihe first time. Other faerDrs sueh a\
<br />tecbnological improvcmel1l.s and improved pooling of power generation
<br />ohviollsly CIlnlrihutcd 10 the gcneral dedinL' in the per unil cost of elec-
<br />tric power through thc 1960'.<, h"l c1earlv Ihc plrlralistic character of Ihe
<br />industry and Ihe c.,ample of ,he pllhliclv lInd cooperalively owned "'g-
<br />mcnls were imponant CilUl)CS of thi'\ trend.
<br />The Federal commitment to puhlic pCll'er shifted slIbslantially with
<br />the inaugural ion of President E'iscnhower in 1953. In August of that
<br />year the Secrctary of thc Imerior, Dougla, McKay, ;,sued a memoran-
<br />dum 'Ialing that, IV hii<' c.xisring preferen(e CU\lomcrs of t he Bonneville
<br />Power Administration would cominue to be servcd, all remaining
<br />power would bc ,old 10 p,.;'.alel)' o\\ned "tilities servicing dome.Vlic and
<br />rural customers. The memorandum indicaled that Interior would, in
<br />addition, not oppose hydroc\ecnic projec\> proposed by local (i.e. pri-
<br />vate) interests. Thb change in poliey was directly comrary 10 the statu-
<br />tory directives issued by the Congress in the Bonneville Project Acl. AI
<br />the same limc, Interior hegan requiring preference eu,tomers 10 con.
<br />tract for electricity 10 meet their anticipated growth for the next several
<br />years. These cu.vlomer.s were required 10 pa)' for a minimum of 80'90 of
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