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All i1l terests tbat contribute to the problem of endangerment sbould bear an equitable sbare of the recovery} costs. 4 002H 7 preservationist basis of endangered species pro- tection, although critical habitat designation is a prominent exception. See Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under tbe ESA, 14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 311 (1990). The year 1981 began the reign of an ad- ministration that for twelve years resisted any strengthening of endangered species protection law. While it is unclear whether, or to what extent, the federal agencies in that period were able to diminish or circumvent ESA strictures in private consultations, the counterreformation policies of Interior Secretary James Watt clearly failed in wildlife and other namral resource areas when evaluated by judges. See generally Cog- gins & Nagel, "Notbi1lg Beside Remains:" The Legal Legacy fofJames G. Watt), 17 H.C. ENVTL. Me. L. REv. 473 (1990). A few courts gave the government a gen- erous benefit of the doubt in land use versus endangered species cases. E.g., Cabinet MOlin. tains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Natio1lal Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987). Most courts, however, followed the more literal reasoning of the Snail Darter opinion. Thus, the Reagan-Bush administration was thwarted in its attempts to allow SpOrt hunting of wolves in Minnesota, Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985); to ignore the Act's procedures when the threat from road building was low, Thomas v. Pelerson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985); to authorize poison- ing that could affect listed species, Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989); to sell oil and gas leases with- out ESA compliance, Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 842 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1340 (1989); and to eradi- cate red-cockaded woodpecker habitat, Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). Human land use became the focal arena for ESA interpretation precisely because habitat de- struction is a more harmful and widespread cause of endangerment than outright killing. The ESA and Land Use The Fundamental Conflict. Even though much of the ESA seems targeted narrowly at par- ticular identified species, its scope is necessar- ily and inherently wide. Listing of a species as endangered or threatened, if at all reasonable, is more than a judgment about that species' population status; it is also a finding that one or more things are seriously wrong with that animal's environment. Bald eagles were not just being shot by disgruntled sheepherders, their entire milieu was poisoned by DDT. The re- NH&e/SUMMER ] 9YJ cently listed salmon runs were not just being overfished, their riverine (and marine) habitat was in wretched condition from multiple causes. Few want to shoot red.cockaded woodpeckers for sport; their decline is attributable to the conversion of climax forests into monoculture tree farms. When the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) lists a species, therefore, an inevitable consequence is that the species not only re- quires direct protective measures (e.g., a ban on taking), but radical or fundamental improve- ments in its habitat as well if the Act's purpose is to be achieved. Such improvements must nec- essarily come from land use controls. Assume, for instance, that the agency lists as endangered a run of salmon that spawn in Idaho. First, controls on commercial, sport, and Indian fishing would be mandatory. Thereafter, if Carson- Truckee Water Conservation Dist. v. Watt, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985), and United States v. Gle1l1l.Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992), are good indi- cations, the regulatory focus will fall on water quantity, The responsible agencies and divert- ers would have to devise means to ensure that sufficient water for passage and spawning re- mained in the hundreds of miles of river flow. ing to the ocean. In the next regulatory phase, barriers to passage (e.g., dams, weirs) would come under expansive scrutiny, and retrofitting would be an obvious solution. If these measures did not markedly improve the species' survival rate, agencies or citizens would be forced to look at other causes of decline. When they did so, they would confront a wide spectrum of human activity: timber cutting; agricultural and industrial poisons; livestock grazing; irrigation; mining; recreation; and so on. The causation equation usually is many-factored. All interests that contribute to the problem of endanger- ment, even if their activities are legal, should bear an equitable share of the recovery costs. If comprehensive approaches are adopted, not only will the species rebound, but the entire environment it inhabits will be healthier. The Rule of Law and the Northern Spotted Owl Enforcement of the ESA strictures by pri. vate conservation organizations has been, by and large, a triumph of the rule of law. Most of the cases cited above were initiated by private cit- izens. But the current big story, of course, is that ofthe northern spotted owl. The prolonged litigation-still far from over-provides a text- book example of how determined private citi- zens can translate the striCt congressional