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<br />2128 <br /> <br />which follow the prior appropriation doctrine. Thus, the definition of "appro- <br />priative rights" contained in the proposed bill which includes non-state derived <br />rights is not only intolerably vague and overbroad, but goes beyond the scope <br />of currently recognized federal rights. <br /> <br />I. The draft bill's definition of "other rights" is non-specific and overly <br />broad. <br />- <br /> <br />In addition to providing for the inventorying of federal reserved water <br />rights and appropriative rights, the proposed bill requires the inventorying <br />of federal claims to "other rights" to the use of water. As defined in Section <br />2 (a) of the bill, "other rights" means all rights of the United States to the <br />use of w1derground or surface waters, other than reserved or appropriative rightsl <br />which "if owned or claimed by a state, a private person, or another entity within <br />a state, would be valid within the state or states where the water is diverted <br />or put to use by the United States." "Other rights" also includes "any other <br />rights to the use of water, whatever their nature or legal basis. . . with respect <br />to which the United States has administrative, managerial or fiduciary responsi- <br />hili ties, 11 which are derived from the "property clausell of the federal Constitution. <br /> <br />The scope of rights potentially covered under the tem "other rights" is thus <br />very broad. Furthemore, it is especially difficult to assess the impact of the <br />bill because of the uncertainty in defining what "rights" the United States holds <br />nnder the "property clause" of the Constitution. In a sense, almost all rights <br />to use water are "property rights. II Indeed, most water rights held under state <br />laws are considered proprietary in nature,16 and, if claimed by the United States, <br />would be deemed to be held pursuant to the property clause. However, some rights <br />or claims are more difficult to classify_ For example, in several states such <br />as Minnesota, no true rights to water use are acquired through state-issued permits. <br />Such permits only give a limited privilege to use water, the ownership of which <br />remains in the state. Such privilege may be revoked or modified at any time in <br />accordance with state law. Under such state laws, it would appear that permit <br />allocations are not rights, and would not be covered under Section 2 (d). Even <br />if the pemit scheme is held to grant a "right" the relation between such permit <br />privileges and the property clause of the Constitution is an open question. <br /> <br />Section 2 (d)'s definition of "other rights" is misleadingly simplistic and <br />non-specific. It would essentially allow the federal government to claim a <br />broad set of undefined rights arising from any number of real or imagined legal <br />bases. The proviso limiting the rights claimed to those held under the "property <br />clause" is of dubious utility, and may, in fact, tend to encourage federal agencies <br />to assert all of their questionable claims under the property clause through the <br />inventory provided in the bill. <br /> <br />II INVENTORY <br /> <br />A. The draft bill includes unquantifiable rights in the inventory. <br /> <br />Riparian law gives an owner of land along a waterway a right to make a rea- <br />sonable use of the water therein, so long as such use does not unreasonably affect <br />the water uses of other riparian owners. t1oreover, riparian water rights may <br />change over time and may be affected by new or expanded water needs of other <br /> <br />16. 1 Water and Ilater Rights *R.E. Clark, Ed. Ss 53. (1967). <br /> <br />(ll) <br />