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<br />2127 <br /> <br />frame of reference when competing with federally reserved rights regardless of <br />the expectations of landowners or established state law in the area. Furthermore, <br />the government could make use of the federal reserved rights irrespective of <br />whether the particular use or amount would be consistent with the limitations <br />imposed by state law. More importantly, if government contentions were accepted, <br />the reserved right would be fully transferable perhaps even out of the watershed <br />or out of the state, because the reserved right is not merely a usufruct (right <br />to use) as is a riparian right but rather is based upon a theory of physical <br />ownership by the government. <br /> <br />In most cases, the federal government will have riparian rights to the extent <br />any private land owner would have them; moreover, the states cannot impede the <br />federal government from proper exercise of its powers and from obtaining whatever <br />amount of water is necessary for that exercise, provided that government compensates <br />holders of vested rights thereby impaired. <br /> <br />G. The draft bill contemplates federal reserved rights claims for in-stream <br />uses. <br /> <br />The draft bill would allow the government to claim reserved rights for in- <br />stream use. Section 3 (a) (6) provides for quantification of water encompassed <br />by a right in terms of the rate of flow to be maintained in the case of rights <br />for in-stream use. <br /> <br />As previously noted, in the states' view it is unreasonable and contrary <br />to the fundamental justification for the reservation doctrine to conclude that <br />sufficient water is reserved for any use of water which goes reasonably to the <br />fulfillment of the purposes of the reservation regardless of the fact that the <br />use was never contemplated by the government at the time of the withdrawal. As <br />far as can be determined, there is no evidence that the government ever con- <br />templated in-stream uses for the fulfillment of any purposes clearly designated <br />or fairly implied in the legislation authorizing reservations of the public domain. <br />For example, in the case of the national forest reserves, the legislative history <br />makes clear that the purpose of these reservations was timber management and water- <br />shed protection, nothing more.IS Not only were minimum stream flows not discussed, <br />but could not be considered as necessary to fulfill those purposes. Thus, allowing <br />the government now to claim in-stream uses for aesthetic or other pusposes goes <br />beyond the proper scope of the reservation doctrine as defined in the case law. <br /> <br />H. The draft bill creates a class of "appropriative" rights not recognized by <br />state law. <br /> <br />.' <br /> <br />Section 2 (c) of the proposed bill defines federal claims to appropriative <br />rights as follows: <br /> <br />"(c) 'Appropriative right' means a right of the United States <br />to use water required initially by it or by another by following <br /> <br />15. See, i.e., Congressional Record of the Senate, May 6, 1897, 909-917; Con- <br />gressional Record of the House, May 10, 1897, 966; Congressional Record of the <br />House, June 1, 1897, 1399. <br /> <br />(9) <br />