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.' When those concepts are translated into realistic cost comparisons accounting for and including the obvious factors which were overlooked or ignored by the USBR in its cost comparisons, the true picture of the economic superiority of the Foothills proposal over the suggested alternatives emerges. Upon seeing the omissions and incorrect assumptions which went into the USBR study, Denver sought a comparative analysis by the widely-recognized utility engineering firm of CH2M Hill. That analysis, described in Exhibit 22, shows the true economic comparisons as follows: Total Present Value of Cash Expenditures For the Years 1978-2048 (Millions of Dollars) Alternatives 125 MGD 500 MGD Foothills Project 140.3 207.6 Low Dam 191.0 272.1 Upstream 197.8 272.5 Rampart 186.7 279.8 It should be clearly obvious that the proposed Foothills Project components are superior to any of the suggested alternatives, not only from a cost standpoint but from a reliability of service standpoint; that obvious superiority was recognized and commented upon in an analysis of the deficiencies in the USBR analysis by Mr. Olin Kalmbach from the vantage point of his broad, world-wide experience in ' these matters, in his two thoughtful letters attached as Exhibits 23 and 24. In his letter discussing the erroneous assumptions made by the USBR (Exhibit 23), Mr. Kalmbach points out how foolish it would be for a responsible public agency to initiate con- struction of some components of the project prior to securing the necessary rights-of-way for the other features of the project. The USBR construction schedules for the alterna- tives assume that Denver could responsibly embark on such a program. The absurdity of such an assumption is demonstrated by the fact that if Denver had followed such an approach here, it could have spent around 80 million dollars on facilities previously scheduled for completion and use in the spring of 1977 only to discover that they could not be put into service, because of delays incident to securing federal rights-of-way, prior to 1981 at the earliest and if any of the suggested structural alternatives were forced upon Denver, not until 1984 or 1985. The Denver Water Board is much too responsible an agency to gamble with the public's money in the manner suggested by the USBR construction SCheduling. (See the letter of Mr. Charles F. Brannan, president of that board on the subject which is Exhibit 25.) -17-