Laserfiche WebLink
<br />- <br />I""" -. <br />\, ,.. <br />amount of natural recharge. Finally, as with the <br />previous two alternatives. no provision in the rule <br />prevents or retards the economic exhaustion of <br />the aquifer. Consequently, this alternative. and <br />the two preceding ones, have serious deficien- <br />cies when applied to jurisdictions where ground- <br />water mining and water shortages are common <br />occurrences. <br /> <br />Socio-Economic Impacts <br /> <br />The notion of sharing responSibility for costs of <br />groundwater depletion among new and old users <br />tends to promote economic efficiency for forcing <br />all users to consider part of the costs of aquifer <br />depletion. A truly efficient Comparative Cause <br />Rule. however, would be applied independent of <br />a priority use rule. Economically, potential gains <br />in efficiency from adopting a rule of comparative <br />cause likely would be offset by the cost of as- <br />certaining the relative contributions to cause, a <br />problem greatly increased in heavy use areas. <br />Consequently, the rule probably is not feasible in <br />water short jurisdictions. <br />The equity impacts of this alternative favor <br />current users over the public generally since the <br />alternative contains no provision to prevent or <br />retard the premature economic exhaustion of the <br />aquifer. Early users are favored over later users. <br />b'" not to as great an extent as would occur <br />under a pure first user rule. <br /> <br />Physical-Hydrologic and Environmental <br />Impacts <br /> <br />This alternative, as have several previous al- <br />ternatives, concerns allocation of the economic <br />costs associated with aquifer declines rather <br />than with the permitted rate of decline or with <br />maintenance of an aquifer. Absent additional <br />regulation. economic exhaustion of the aquifer <br />remains a possibility. Without knowing the nature <br />of any regulation. however. physical-hydrologic <br />and environmental impacts cannot be ascer- <br />tained. <br /> <br />Alternative #10: Adopt a ground- <br />water property rights system <br />where rights are created and <br />evidenced by securing a permit <br />from a state agency. <br /> <br />Description and Methods of <br />Implementation <br /> <br />A wide vanetyof statutory permit systems have <br />replaced common law groundwater property <br />rights in many eastern and western states. The <br /> <br />essence of a permit system is a requirement that <br />property owners receive permission from a state <br />agency belore they may drill a well and pump <br />from it. Absent a permit. landowners have no <br />property right in underlying water that is subject <br />to constitutional protection.39 <br />In permit states the terms of the permit define <br />the nature of the groundwater property right. In <br />many western states a system of prior appropri- <br />ation is used. A permittee is limited to the amount <br />of water that can be beneficially used on over- <br />lying lands with permits issued on a first-come, <br />first served basis. The number of permits that will <br />be issued in a particular location varies from <br />state to state in correlation with the degree to <br />which a state permits mining of the groundwater <br />aquifer. <br />Since most substantive rules of law can be <br />incorporated inlo a permit which then serves as <br />the source of a groundwater property right, the <br />major value of permit systems is the degree of <br />management that they facilitate_ Consequently, <br />permits are generally incorporated into "critical <br />area" legislation in states which lack statewide <br />water management programs. Permits may also <br />provide greater certainty to water right holders. <br />While permits do not inherently increase certain- <br />ty of rights. they may do so if the parameters of <br />the permit are drafted with specificity in mind. <br />Finally, a major value 01 permit systems is the <br />lOcreased ability to monitor water use changes. <br />Even where active state or local water manage- <br />ment is not contemplated. permits provide an <br />important source of data that can be used to <br />identify potential future problems at a time when <br />they can be averted at a relatively low cost. <br /> <br />Case Study <br /> <br />Colorado, a prior appropriation permit state. <br />uses a two part test to determine the amount 01 <br />nontributary groundwaterdQ available for appro' <br />priation. Regulation varies depending on <br />whether the groundwater is found in a designa- <br />ted or nondesignated basin. Within a designated <br />basin, new appropriation permits will be issued <br />unless the current rate of pumping in a circular <br />area within a three mile radius of the proposed <br />well equalS or exceeds the rate of pumping that <br />would result in a 40% depletion of the available <br />groundwater in that area over a 25year period.41 <br />The three mile rule was adopted to implement a <br />statutory provision empowering the Colorado <br />Ground Water Commission to deny an appli.:a- <br />lion for a groundwater appropriation if it finds that <br />the proposed appropriation will unreasonably <br />impair existing water rights from the same <br />source. taking into account the area, geologic <br />conditions. annual recharge. the priority and <br /> <br />3.13 <br />