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<br />GJJl'>b!t <br /> <br />greater uniformity of application that should flow <br />from more detailed legislative pronouncements_ <br /> <br />Socia. Economic Impacts <br /> <br />As a more sophisticated version of the Eastern <br />Reasonable Use Rule. the Restatement Rule dI- <br />minishes some of the disadvantages discussed <br />under the Eastern Rule. Particularly. the Restate- <br />ment Rule offers a landowner much more <br />security than the Eastern Reasonable Use Rule <br />while preserving a great measure of flexibility. A <br />landowner is secure in a right to capture water <br />found beneath his land as long as the capture <br />does not result in unreasonable harm to another. <br />While "unreasonable harm" is subject to judicial <br />interpretation, the Restatement contains criteria <br />constraining the choice. The flexibility of the rule <br />probably allows a state to adopt most forms of <br />regulation without fear of constitutional <br />challenge. <br />The equity impacts of the Restatement Rule <br />cannot be determined accurately since much <br />turns on specific holdings of reasonableness. As <br />a rule of non-liability however, it tends to favor <br />current users over future users. <br /> <br />Physical.Hydrologic and Environmental <br />Impacts <br /> <br />Physical-hydrologic and environmental im- <br />pacts of Alternative #6 cannot be determined <br />with any degree of precision. Too much dependS <br />upon the manner in which "unreasonable" is <br />interpreted in judicial decisions. A potential for <br />minimizing adverse consequences is present, <br />however, given the flexibility of the alternative. <br /> <br />Alternative #7: Adopt a First User <br />Rule as the definition of ground- <br />water property rights in Nebraska. <br /> <br />Description and Methods of <br />Implementation <br /> <br />A recent law review article suggested three <br />alternatives to the non liability rule set forth in <br />RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 9 858 <br />and discussed in AlternatIve #6.33 The first <br />suggestion is discussed here and the other two <br />in the next two alternatives. <br />The authors' first proposal would incorporate <br />principles of western prior appropriation law into <br />groundwater property rights. The suggested rule <br />would read as follows. <br />A possessor of land or his grantee who uses <br />groundwater from an aquifer is subject to <br />liability for interference with the use of water. <br /> <br />or lor damage to the land surface or structures <br />upon the overlying land. caused to another <br />whose use of specific nature and amount <br />predates his use, unless such prior use con- <br />stitutes waste34 <br /> <br />The First User Rule is more certain than the <br />Restatement of common law rules and hence, <br />should encourage early investment and dis- <br />courage litigation. The rule may not be perceived <br />fair, however. since it prefers early, less valuable <br />uses, over later. more valuable uses. Further. <br />more. the rule may be difficult to administer <br />because, at least in theory,each subsequent use <br />would cause some injury to all prior uses located <br />over a common aquifer. Some of the above diffi- <br />culties could be lessened, however, by adopting <br />a full-fledged prior appropriation system as dis- <br />cussed in Alternative :# 1 O. Finally. a First User <br />Rule does not prevent or control aquifer de- <br />pletion. <br /> <br />Socia-Economic Impacts <br /> <br />A First User Rule gives a landowner greater <br />security of right than some other rules provided <br />the holder of the right is an early user. Favoring <br />early users is not necessarily economically <br />efficient. however, since early uses may be less <br />valuable than later uses. It is thus necessary that <br />rights and priorities be transferable if First User <br />Rules are to lead to efficient results. A First User <br />Rule also is somewhat infleXible since. once the <br />rule is established, regulating the activity of early <br />users would be constitutIonally suspect. <br />The equity impacts of thiS alternative favor <br />early users over later users and users of water <br />over conservers of water. Since aquifer depletion <br />is not controlled by a First User Rule, current <br />users are favored over the public generally. This <br />rule contains no preference between overlying <br />owner and off-land users. <br /> <br />Physical.Hydrologic and Environmental <br />Impacts <br /> <br />A lirst user rule. absent additional regulation, <br />would likely lead to rapid aquifer depletions since <br />some users would have an absolute right to <br />continue pumping. The rule is more concerned <br />with who gets prime access to groundwater than <br />with permissible levels of extraction. <br /> <br />Alternative #8: Adopt a Prefer' <br />ence in Use Rule as the definition <br />of groundwater property rights in <br />Nebraska. <br /> <br />3-11 <br />