<br />Alternative # 12: Ouantify the amount of water
<br />hydrologically available beneath particular
<br />surface formations and give each land-
<br />owner a vested righf towithdraw a particular
<br />quantity of water based on the number of
<br />acres of productive irrigable land owned by
<br />the overlying landowner.
<br />Alternative # 13: Codify the rules derived from
<br />Nebraska cases, as near as they can be
<br />determined. as the definition of ground-
<br />water property rights in Nebraska.
<br />
<br />Information Presented
<br />for Each Alternative
<br />
<br />For each alternative discussed below, informa-
<br />tion is presented under three headings:
<br />Description and Methods of Implementation;
<br />Socio-Economic Impacts; and Physical-
<br />Hydrological and Environmental Impacts.
<br />Information under the first heading, Description
<br />and Methods of Implementation, describes
<br />the alternative and how it could be implemented.
<br />For each alternative strengths and weaknesses
<br />are discussed. No water rights system has been
<br />entirely satisfactory. The weaknesses of many of
<br />the common law systems have become apparent
<br />over time. The ultimate importance of the
<br />property rights system adopted concerns who
<br />will make ultimate decisions on groundwater use,
<br />how those decisions will be made, and who will
<br />be the primary beneficiaries of the benefits that
<br />flow from the use of groundwater. Vested private
<br />property rights act as effective barriers to many
<br />management alternatives. Consequently. great
<br />care should be taken in making fundamental
<br />alterations in the existing system of rights. On the
<br />other hand, water users need some certai nty that
<br />their source of water will not be severely limited
<br />once the users have made substantial invest-
<br />ments relying on the availability of water. Finaliy,
<br />the limitations of the alternatives often can be
<br />understood best by examining problems en-
<br />countered in states where the rules have been
<br />adopted. Consequently, where appropriate, a
<br />subsection detaiiing a Case Study is included
<br />under this heading.
<br />Information under the second heading,Socio-
<br />Economic Impacts, describes how implement-
<br />ing the alternative would impact on economic
<br />efficiency 1 and equity.2 The discussion is
<br />necessarily theoretical, and consequently, no
<br />attempt is made to quantify the magnitude of the
<br />expected impacts. A change that increases
<br />economic effiCiency is generally desirable, how-
<br />ever, since an efficient change translates into a
<br />greater output of societal goods and services
<br />from a particular combination of resource inputs.
<br />
<br />3-2
<br />
<br />In a perfect economic world, the market would
<br />always allocate resources, goods, and services
<br />efficiently. For a variety of reasons, however, a
<br />market may not operate efficiently. The cost of
<br />completing a particular transaction that would
<br />increase satisfaction might well exceed the
<br />benefit to be gained from the transaction31n that
<br />case, a potential gain in economic efficiency will
<br />be prevented by transaction costs4 Alterna-
<br />tives that reduce transaction costs, therefore,
<br />generally increase economic efficiency. Similar-
<br />ly, an efficient transaction may not take place
<br />because the information necessary to evaluate
<br />the transaction is not avaiiable at low cost.5
<br />Reducing information costs, therefore, also
<br />enhances economic efficiency.
<br />Equity refers roughly to the "fairness" of a
<br />particular system of production and con-
<br />sumption which may, or may not, be efficient.
<br />While economics cannot answer the question of
<br />what is fair or equitable, it can indicate what the
<br />equity impacts of a particular alternative are
<br />likely to be. An alternative has an equity impact if
<br />it results in benefits being conferred on some at
<br />the expense of uncompensated losses which
<br />must be borne by others. In theory, an efficient
<br />alternative should produce the necessary
<br />revenues to compensate anyone who suffers an
<br />adverse equity impact from adoption of the
<br />alternative.6 Whether or not such effects should
<br />be compensated for, however, is a political and
<br />social question caught up in personal notions of
<br />fairness and justice. Consequently, the equity
<br />effects of particular alternatives are noted with
<br />no attempt made to evaluate whether those
<br />effects are fair or not fair.
<br />Information under the final heading, Physical-
<br />Hydrologic and Environmental Impacts,
<br />describes the probable effect that changes in
<br />water use patterns, which would accompany the
<br />adoption of a given alternative, would have on
<br />hydrologic relationships and on the physical
<br />environment.7 Most of the alternatives identified
<br />in this chapter, however, do not lend themselves
<br />to detailed description of their probable
<br />physical/hydroiogical or environmental impacts.
<br />Since these alternatives are concerned only with
<br />property rights, and not with how exercise of
<br />those rights might be restricted or regulated,
<br />many variables potentially intervene between
<br />the policy alternatives and the impacts. Such
<br />variables include geographic factors, manage-
<br />ment systems. government regulation, techno-
<br />logical changes, and the effect of changing
<br />economic incentives and restraints on water use.
<br />Where, however, implementation of a particular
<br />alternative requires access to sophisticated
<br />hydrologic data, a discussion of the hydrologic
<br />problems involved is included under this head-
<br />ing.
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