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<br />Alternative # 12: Ouantify the amount of water <br />hydrologically available beneath particular <br />surface formations and give each land- <br />owner a vested righf towithdraw a particular <br />quantity of water based on the number of <br />acres of productive irrigable land owned by <br />the overlying landowner. <br />Alternative # 13: Codify the rules derived from <br />Nebraska cases, as near as they can be <br />determined. as the definition of ground- <br />water property rights in Nebraska. <br /> <br />Information Presented <br />for Each Alternative <br /> <br />For each alternative discussed below, informa- <br />tion is presented under three headings: <br />Description and Methods of Implementation; <br />Socio-Economic Impacts; and Physical- <br />Hydrological and Environmental Impacts. <br />Information under the first heading, Description <br />and Methods of Implementation, describes <br />the alternative and how it could be implemented. <br />For each alternative strengths and weaknesses <br />are discussed. No water rights system has been <br />entirely satisfactory. The weaknesses of many of <br />the common law systems have become apparent <br />over time. The ultimate importance of the <br />property rights system adopted concerns who <br />will make ultimate decisions on groundwater use, <br />how those decisions will be made, and who will <br />be the primary beneficiaries of the benefits that <br />flow from the use of groundwater. Vested private <br />property rights act as effective barriers to many <br />management alternatives. Consequently. great <br />care should be taken in making fundamental <br />alterations in the existing system of rights. On the <br />other hand, water users need some certai nty that <br />their source of water will not be severely limited <br />once the users have made substantial invest- <br />ments relying on the availability of water. Finaliy, <br />the limitations of the alternatives often can be <br />understood best by examining problems en- <br />countered in states where the rules have been <br />adopted. Consequently, where appropriate, a <br />subsection detaiiing a Case Study is included <br />under this heading. <br />Information under the second heading,Socio- <br />Economic Impacts, describes how implement- <br />ing the alternative would impact on economic <br />efficiency 1 and equity.2 The discussion is <br />necessarily theoretical, and consequently, no <br />attempt is made to quantify the magnitude of the <br />expected impacts. A change that increases <br />economic effiCiency is generally desirable, how- <br />ever, since an efficient change translates into a <br />greater output of societal goods and services <br />from a particular combination of resource inputs. <br /> <br />3-2 <br /> <br />In a perfect economic world, the market would <br />always allocate resources, goods, and services <br />efficiently. For a variety of reasons, however, a <br />market may not operate efficiently. The cost of <br />completing a particular transaction that would <br />increase satisfaction might well exceed the <br />benefit to be gained from the transaction31n that <br />case, a potential gain in economic efficiency will <br />be prevented by transaction costs4 Alterna- <br />tives that reduce transaction costs, therefore, <br />generally increase economic efficiency. Similar- <br />ly, an efficient transaction may not take place <br />because the information necessary to evaluate <br />the transaction is not avaiiable at low cost.5 <br />Reducing information costs, therefore, also <br />enhances economic efficiency. <br />Equity refers roughly to the "fairness" of a <br />particular system of production and con- <br />sumption which may, or may not, be efficient. <br />While economics cannot answer the question of <br />what is fair or equitable, it can indicate what the <br />equity impacts of a particular alternative are <br />likely to be. An alternative has an equity impact if <br />it results in benefits being conferred on some at <br />the expense of uncompensated losses which <br />must be borne by others. In theory, an efficient <br />alternative should produce the necessary <br />revenues to compensate anyone who suffers an <br />adverse equity impact from adoption of the <br />alternative.6 Whether or not such effects should <br />be compensated for, however, is a political and <br />social question caught up in personal notions of <br />fairness and justice. Consequently, the equity <br />effects of particular alternatives are noted with <br />no attempt made to evaluate whether those <br />effects are fair or not fair. <br />Information under the final heading, Physical- <br />Hydrologic and Environmental Impacts, <br />describes the probable effect that changes in <br />water use patterns, which would accompany the <br />adoption of a given alternative, would have on <br />hydrologic relationships and on the physical <br />environment.7 Most of the alternatives identified <br />in this chapter, however, do not lend themselves <br />to detailed description of their probable <br />physical/hydroiogical or environmental impacts. <br />Since these alternatives are concerned only with <br />property rights, and not with how exercise of <br />those rights might be restricted or regulated, <br />many variables potentially intervene between <br />the policy alternatives and the impacts. Such <br />variables include geographic factors, manage- <br />ment systems. government regulation, techno- <br />logical changes, and the effect of changing <br />economic incentives and restraints on water use. <br />Where, however, implementation of a particular <br />alternative requires access to sophisticated <br />hydrologic data, a discussion of the hydrologic <br />problems involved is included under this head- <br />ing. <br />