<br />GOiH~::J4
<br />
<br />private property shall not be taken for public
<br />use without just compensation; of the
<br />Nebraska Bill of Rights declaring that "The
<br />property of no person shall be taken or
<br />damaged for public use without just com-
<br />pensation therefore,"12
<br />A significant implication of the Luchsinger
<br />decision is that landowners have some pro-
<br />prietary interest in the water in place beneath
<br />their landS,13 The property right is apparently
<br />limited, however, to a right that runs against
<br />those who are not making a reasonable use of
<br />the water within the American Rule meaning, A
<br />secondary right, of course, will run against all
<br />users of water from a common source to the
<br />extent the correlative rights language in Olson is
<br />applied during a water shortage,
<br />
<br />3. Metropolitan Utilities District v.
<br />Merritt Beach CO.14 (1966)
<br />
<br />,.--
<br />
<br />The next significant groundwater rights case
<br />occurred twenty-five years after Luchsinger, In
<br />the interim period the Nebraska Legislature
<br />enacted the City, Village and Municipal Ground
<br />Water Permit Act.15 The constitutionality of this
<br />Act was challenged in Metropolitan Utilities, In
<br />upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the
<br />Nebraska Supreme Court discussed ground,
<br />water rights, Defendant M,U.D, had received a
<br />permit under the Act to withdraw 60 million
<br />gallons of water a day from wells located on the
<br />north bank of the Platte River and on an adjacent
<br />island, Water was to be transferred to Omaha,
<br />located in a different river basin, Ninety,three
<br />percent of the "groundwater" pumped was the
<br />result of induced aquifer recharge from the Platte
<br />River.
<br />The opinion contains several significant state-
<br />ments, First, the court literally applied the stat-
<br />utory definition of groundwater as "water which
<br />occurs or moves, seeps, filters, or percolates
<br />through the ground under the surface of the
<br />land",16 and ignored physical realities that a
<br />diversion of surface water was, in fact, taking
<br />place,
<br />Second, the opinion holds that authority can be
<br />granted to transfer groundwater off the overlying
<br />land without offending constitutionally vested
<br />rights, at least where the reasonable uses of
<br />overlying landowners are not impaired and a
<br />public purpose is served. I n other words "excess
<br />groundwaters" are available for use off the over'
<br />lying land, a holding consistent with the Cor,
<br />relative Rights Rule of groundwater property
<br />rights, but contrary to traditional interpretations
<br />of the American Rule, Interestingly, however, the
<br />supreme court used a definition of the American
<br />Rule that dropped the "sharing in times of
<br />
<br />shortage," language announced in Olson and
<br />repeated in Luchsinger, The Metropolitan
<br />Utilities definition reads as follows:
<br />The American, as distinguished from the
<br />English Rule, is that, while the owner of the
<br />land is entitled to appropriate subterranean
<br />or other waters accumulating on his land,
<br />which thereby becomes a part of the realty,
<br />he cannot extract and appropriate them in
<br />excess of a reasonable and beneficial use
<br />upon the land he owns, unconnected with
<br />the beneficial use of the land, especially if
<br />the exercise of such use in excess of the
<br />reasonable and beneficial use is injurious to
<br />others, who have substantial rights to the
<br />water.17
<br />It is thus possible to read Metropolitan Utilities as
<br />establishing a limit to a landowner'S proprietary
<br />interest in underlying groundwater, the limit
<br />defined by the amount of water that can be put to
<br />reasonable and beneficial use on the overlying
<br />land,
<br />
<br />4, Burger v. City of Beatrice18 (1967)
<br />
<br />Although groundwater property rights were not
<br />directly the subject of Burger, the case has
<br />significant implications, In Burger, defendant city
<br />attempted to use its power of eminent domain to
<br />condemn an easement on plaintiff farmer's lands
<br />so that water could be withdrawn from an under-
<br />lying aquifer. The water was to be used by two
<br />large fertilizer plants located outside the
<br />Beatrice city limits, The Nebraska Supreme
<br />Court held that the city's power of eminent
<br />domain did not extend to condemnation of agri-
<br />cultural water rights for use by industries located
<br />outside the city limits,
<br />Since the case turned on the limits of a city's
<br />eminent domain power, the nature of the right
<br />that was to be condem ned was not discussed. In
<br />light of Metropolitan Utilities, the value of the
<br />pumping easement was conjectural. If the water
<br />in question was excess, that is, water not needed
<br />to satisfy reasonable beneficial uses on the over-
<br />lying land, then Metropolitan Utilities would
<br />suggest that the farmers would suffer no
<br />compensable injury as long as their surface
<br />rights were not invaded, Even if the sought
<br />waters were excess, however, Burger held that
<br />the power of eminent domain could not be used
<br />to secure access to the water under the restrict,
<br />ed circumstances of the case,
<br />Assuming, as is more likely, that the ground,
<br />water sought to be condemned in Burger was not
<br />all excess, what interests of the farmers would
<br />have been taken by the city had the supreme
<br />court approved the condemnation? M,U.O,
<br />
<br />1-3
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