<br />Alternative #8: Adopt a Preference in
<br />Use Rule as the definition of ground-
<br />water property rights in Nebraska.
<br />Alternative #9: Adopt a Comparative
<br />Cause Rule as the definition of ground-
<br />water property rights in Nebraska.
<br />Alternatiyes Seven through Nine contem-
<br />plate essentially unlimited access to supplies of
<br />groundwater with the crucial issue being who
<br />ought to bear the costs of aquifer depletion that
<br />reduces water tables and artesian head, Under
<br />Alternative Seyen early users are protected
<br />from later users, Under AlternatiYe Eight pre'
<br />ferred users are protected from less preferred
<br />users, Under Alternative Nine costs of aqUifer
<br />depletion are shared among all users in pro'
<br />portion to their use, The economic burden im'
<br />posed on later or less preferred users by Alterna-
<br />tives Seven and Eight may act to slow aquifer
<br />depletion as might the cost of ascertaining
<br />comparative cause in Alternatiye Nine,
<br />Alternative #10: Adopt a groundwater
<br />property rights system where rights are
<br />created and eYidenced by securing a
<br />perm it from an appropriate state agency.
<br />This alternative can be incorporated into most
<br />substantive rules of law, Permits could thus be
<br />granted on the basis of first in time' first in right,
<br />on the basis of the number of acres owned, on the
<br />basis of intended use, or on any other basis, Thus,
<br />permits by themselves have no impact on the
<br />rate of aquifer depletion, Permits do, however,
<br />give landowners some security of right and serve
<br />as a means by which water uses can be inventor'
<br />ied and water management decisions improved,
<br />Permits are particularly useful where a decision
<br />is made to mine an aquifer.
<br />Alternative #11: Quantify the amount of
<br />water hydrologically ayailable beneath
<br />particular surface formations and give
<br />each landowner a vested right to with-
<br />draw a particular quantity of water based
<br />on the total number of acres of oyerlying
<br />land owned by the landowner.
<br />Alternative #12: Quantify the amount of
<br />water hydrologically available beneath
<br />particular surface formations and give
<br />each landowner a yested right to with-
<br />draw a particular quantity of water based
<br />on the number of acres of productiye
<br />irrigable land owned by the oyerlying
<br />owner.
<br />Alternatiyes Eleven and Twelye would
<br />quantify a landowner's property interest in
<br />groundwater found beneath his or her land, Each
<br />landowner would be assigned a particular
<br />quantity of water as his or her share of the aqUifer
<br />stock, Alternative Eleven would allocate water
<br />in proportion to the total quantity of land owned
<br />
<br />VIII
<br />
<br />whileAlternatiye Twelye would allocate ground,
<br />water in proportion to the total number of
<br />irrigable acres owned, The size of the allocation
<br />could be based on total waterin storageoronthe
<br />basis of natural recharge or on some combin'
<br />ation thereof, The rate of aquifer depletion, if any,
<br />would depend on the choice of the basis for
<br />allocation, The direct economic benefit of
<br />groundwater would be shared among overlying
<br />landowners based on the number of acres
<br />owned, not the amount of water used, much as
<br />rights to other mineral deposits are based on
<br />land ownership, A significant advantage of
<br />quantification is the susceptibility of quantified
<br />rights to ma'rket transfers, The cost of gathering
<br />the hydrologic data necessary for quantification,
<br />however, would be very high,
<br />Alternatiye #13: Codify the rules derived
<br />from Nebraska cases, as near as they can
<br />be determined, as the definition of
<br />groundwater property rights in
<br />Nebraska.
<br />Alternative Thirteen would adopt by legisla-
<br />tion the consequences of the Nebraska Rule of
<br />Reasonable Use as it has developed or is expect,
<br />ed to develop in case law, The effect of this
<br />alternative would be to take what now may be a
<br />mere license to use ground water and transform
<br />it into a vested property right. Landowners under
<br />this alternative would be entitled to a reasonable
<br />share of tre groundwater supply based on land
<br />ownership if groundwater supplies were in,
<br />sufficient to meet the needs of all owners, As long
<br />as supplies were adequate, landowners would be
<br />entitled to withdraw as much water as they could
<br />put to reasonable and beneficial use on overlying
<br />land that they owned, Any transfers off the over'
<br />lying land would be SUbject to state approval and
<br />the vested rights of other overlying landowners,
<br />Rights acqUired pursuant to this alternative
<br />would be appurtenant to the land and could not
<br />be sold or in any way transferred without the
<br />express consent of the public,
<br />Alternatives #13 and # 1 are similar, but not
<br />identical. Whereas Alternative # 1 would leave in
<br />effect the provisions of LB 375 (which enact in a
<br />general way the reasonable use and correlative
<br />rights aspects of the Nebraska Rule), Alternative
<br /># 13 goes one step beyond that general
<br />language by enacting more specific rules, some
<br />of which are noted above, Those more specific
<br />rules are derived from either a previously con,
<br />firmed or anticipated interpretation of how the
<br />general rule would be appiied in particular situ'
<br />ations, In a sense, Alternative #13 is like a
<br />definition of the Nebraska Rule of Reasonable
<br />Use, while Alternative # 1, including LB 375, is
<br />more in the nature of a statement of that rule, As
<br />between the two rules, Alternative # 13 provides
<br />
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