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compact by making it part of the states' statutory law, have made the compact "binding on the state and its citizens for the duration of the agreement.,,52 The provisions of the compact itself determine the conditions and procedures for termination or amendment of the compact. A later conflicting state statute cannot impair the agreement and the compact takes prece- dence.53 Congress, on the other hand, may enact legislation which is incompatible with a compact even though it had previously granted its con- sent. It has, in fact, been suggested that, In sum, the legal effect of Congressional consent may be said to be no more than an ad hoc approval by a particu lar Congress of the purposes of the compact, subject to the right of a later Congress to specifically revoke or amend its consent or to super- sede the approved compact plan by con- flicting legislation.... But while this uncertain tenure may seem an unsatisfactory founda- tion for an interstate undertaking, it is no different than the uncertainty attending any Congressional legislation, which is always subject to change.54 The compact approach has a number of general advantages over the equitable appor- tionment approach, discussed with reference to litigation before the United States Supreme Court, as a way of resolving interstate water allocation problems: 1. First, a compact provides certainty and a framework for dealing with the compli- cated questions of interstate allocation of water... 2. Second, a compact provides increased flexibility. It can provide forthe possibility of future change of conditions. Judicial resolutions are limited to the controversy at hand. 3. Third, a compact can provide for expert administration. The judiciary is iII-equip- ped to deal with the technical issues involved in interstate water manage- ment. 55 The Congress, however, is equally ill-equipped to design and implement a comprehensive plan for apportioning interstate waters. 56 The advantages of the compact approach have been touted by many and, in the analysis of one scholar, it Affords a viable and desirable institutional approach to regional water problems in light of the following legal and political criteria[:] (1) The availability and adequacy of legal and administrative authority that may be ex- ercised by compact. 2-8 (2) The relative ease of creating, implement- ing and altering a compact program, in- cluding the ability to match function and area and to respond expeditiously to changing needs and conditions. (3) The ability to afford and promote mean- ingful public participation in planning and decision-making. (4) The ability to facilitate and achieve pro- ductive cooperation and coordination among federal, state, local and private interests. (5) Political accountability and responsive- ness. (6) The ability to establish reasonable visibil- ity and to attract adequate executive leadership and staff.57 In addition, the fact that an interstate compact is based on the voluntary agreement of the states involved makes it an attractive method for handling interstate water problems. "[A) major criticism of compacts is that they require an inordinately long time to negotiate and effectuate by state ratification and Con- gressional consent.',58 Delays in this regard are also usually caused by specific policy controver- sies. It has been suggested the principal draw- back of compacts ";s the lack of commitment to meaningful attack on regional water problems which has traditionally characterized most compact efforts, perhaps best reflected by anemic grants of authority and financial support.,,59 In addition, compacts suffer in differ- ing degrees from "lack of appropriate enforce- ment and adjudicatory powers, from interminable negotiating difficulties, from lack of flexibility, and from inadequate regulatory machinery.',60 In short, states may prefer the compact approach because it permits their active participation in any agreement that is forged, without the impo- sition of unwanted regulations or exaction of unwilling concessions. At the same time, how- ever, states have been reluctant to grant suffi- cient powers and authority to a compact com- mission to insure the development and imple- mentation of significant water resources pro- jects. Another weakness of compacts that has been identified is that agreements have been negoti- ated "too precisely and in too much detail, with- out sufficient information and study of the problems involved. Moreover, compacts have not provided the proper kind of administrative machinery to deal with the evolving problems of a basin."61 A state should be aware that when it signs an interstate compact it is bound by the terms of that agreement and may change or repudiate the compact only in accordance with