Laserfiche WebLink
<br />" <br /> <br />o <br />Io!"- <br />,,~ <br />o <br /> <br />Raphael J. Moses <br />Colorado <br /> <br />I recall the period of the Brownell Task Force as a discouraging, distressing part of my career. <br />The reactivation of the Committee of Fourteen seemed like a convenient way to pay' lip service <br />to the Basin States' interests without their really having much of a say in things. <br /> <br />The Committee did meet at least twice with Ambassador Brownell and his Task Force. I do <br />recall a meeting with the State Dc!partment's lawyers, who persuaded us that we really couldn't <br />give Mexico just any kind of water. They pointed out that we might be able to make a case in <br />International Court, but the U.S. would get a black eye for trying; And as a lawyer; the mote <br />I got into it, the more inequitable it seemed [to insist on strict application of the appropriation <br />doctrine]. But in meeting with the Task Force, I always had a feeling that we were in the cat's <br />paws. Our constant complaint was that every time we told the Brownell and [Samuel] Eaton our <br />bottom line, they would come back the next day and stan negotiating from that position. <br /> <br />The only time I met any of the members privately was when Governor Love invited my wife <br />and me to dinner ,with the Brownells shortly after he was appointed. ' The matter of the Colorado <br />River came up, but the conversation was pretty general, since he had not really had time to <br />become familiar with the issues. And I did not accompany Brownell on his tour of the Yuma <br />area. <br /> <br />We did meet more frequently with mwc Commissioner Joe Friedkin. Joe was really the ' <br />liaison-Brownell didn't speak much Spanish, and Joe is fluent. He is also a man of complete <br />integrity, whom the Mexicans trusted and respected. I think Browrtell relied heavily on him. <br /> <br />In the end, we wound up doing the same thing we always do-throwing money at the problem, <br />Everyone on the Committee of Fourteen except Arizona thought thatWelltott-Mohawk should <br />be bought out and shut down-it was so obviously the source of the problem, and most of the <br />crops they were growing were subsidized anyway. The Bureau of ReClamation had no business <br />expecting Mexico to take that drain water-it was bad! But because of Arizona's opposition <br />(and Carl Hayden's being Chairman of Senate Appropriations), it wouldn't fly politically. <br /> <br />We all favored a settlement based on salt balance. We felt it was fair, and could have been <br />achieved without building a desalting plant. Mexico rejected it, as they did the U.S. offer to <br />bypass the remainder of the Wellton-Mohawk drainage without charging them for it. I think the <br />Mexicans felt that they had us on the defensive, and wanted to get as much out of the situation <br />as they could. <br /> <br />After they rejected these offers and settled on the differential in Minute No. 242, we had no <br />choice. All of the Committee members were opposed to the long-term use of upstream storage <br />to dilute or replace Wellton-Mohawk return flows, and took the firm position that it was a <br />national obligation. We would have been interested in importation but it was politically <br />infeasible; [Senator Henry] Jackson had forbidden even the study of it at that time. Releases <br />from storage would have hurt only the Upper Basin [which was not the cause of the problem]. <br /> <br />B-6 <br /> <br />,~ <br /> <br />;: <br /> <br />" <br /> <br />'J; <br />;~ <br />, <br /> <br />, <br />,~ <br /> <br />'j;; <br />~, <br />~ <br />1<;; <br /> <br />'~ <br /> <br />N <br />;-'~ <br />t~ <br />~ <br /> <br />;'f <br /> <br />,@ <br />,;~ <br />~ <br /> <br />" <br />'" <br /> <br />,~ <br />.~ <br />~i <br />" ':.~~ <br />, ",~l <br />" <br />~ <br /> <br />~ <br />~~ <br />"] <br />'j <br /> <br />;~"'~ <br />i::.~ <br /> <br />