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<br />Myron B. Holburt
<br />California
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<br />My involvement with the Mexican salinity problem goes back to the mid-1960s. I joined the
<br />Colorado River Board in August 1965, and attended Committee of Fourteen meetings lifter that
<br />date. Shortly after I became Chief Engineer in March 1968, the Governor appointed me a
<br />member of the Committee.
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<br />As far as the Committee's initial position, everyone had decided to support Wellton-Mohawk.
<br />, Rationally, I think Arizona would have been better off without the project, but there was a lack
<br />of urban influence at the time. No, one spoke up for the Central Arizona Project. If Arizona
<br />had supported the purchase of land from farmers in the Wellton-Mohawk District by the U.S.;
<br />there would have been a more dependable water supply for CAP. Everyone on the Committee
<br />was, of course, opposed to any continuing use of upstream storage water unless it was replaced.
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<br />The Committee of Fourteen met several times with Ambassador Brownell, Sam Eaton, and the
<br />Task Force. Some of the Task Force and Working Group members talked to me privately-I
<br />remember talking to Sam Eaton, Pat O'Meara, Jim Smith, and Jan van Schilfgaarde.,...,but our
<br />conversations were usually at meetings. I did tour the Yuma area with Brownell; I think most
<br />of the Committee of Fourteen were there. As I recall, the Bureau of Reclamation led the tour,
<br />and its representatives talked mostly about technological solutions to the salinity problem.
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<br />The real force behind the choice of a desalting plant as a solution to the salinity problem with
<br />Mexico seemed to be the State Dc!partment. Once Echeverria made salinity a major issue, the
<br />,State Department found it attractive. Here was a problem, they could solve by spending
<br />money-unlike other major problems like drugs, trade, and immigration. Brownell was a very
<br />good politician who realized the influence of the Committee of Fourteen, and promised that the
<br />solution wouldn't cost the states money or water. He did not believe that there was any practical
<br />alternative.
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<br />At one time the U.S. talked about improving the agricultural systems in the Mexicali Valley [to
<br />reduce the effects of salinity] but the Mexicans would not agree to this as a potential solution.
<br />There were supposed to be groundwater agreements, too, but they never materialized either.
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<br />Because of the State Department's strong interest, Brownell went ahead with the negotiation of
<br />the Minute [No. 242] even though there were some unsettled issues with the states-replacement
<br />of the brine stream, and providing power for the desalting plant and the groundwater pumping
<br />along the border. The figure of 115 ppm :t30 ppm was drawn from historical data-a weighted
<br />average of the salinity differential over some period of years. It was sound; I remember that
<br />we checked it independently. The Minute itself never mentioned the desalting plant. Ialways
<br />thought that Mexico insisted on this so that they would still have the guarantee even if the
<br />desalting plant was never built.
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