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~ ~ J-Io 0';) could be levfed partly or wholly upon downstream beneficiaries. The implled d1str1butfonal 1mpacts could be calculated from the results 1n tables 3 and 4). Addftfonal control strategfes were fntroduced fn the analysls of dfstr1butfonal effects. Sfnce earl fer stud1es place potent1al on-farm salt load reductfons for the Grand Valley fn the 100,000 to 150,000 ton range, strateg1es ach1ev1ng that level of reduct10n are emphaslzed. Both the net soclal cost of sa11n1ty control and the distribution of salinlty control costs between farmers and government vary widely among the optlons. Effluent and lnfluent taxes, of course, place the entlre cost burden on farmers, whlle the government bears all costs wlth subsldlzed lrrlgation system lmprovements. Increasino Block Water (Influent) Taxes. This strategy mltlgates some of the cost burden ln excess of net soclal cost. Allowlng a certain amount of inframarglnal water at a low cost. whfle still assessing the tax at the margin, would enable farmers to retaln much of thelr producer surplus. For example. at a water prfce of S15.80 per acre-foot ($4.00 operatlng cost plus Sll.80 tax), the model produces a salt load reductlon of 58,350 tons for $7.16 per ton net soclal cost (table 4). Yet th1s method would cost farmers $44.25 per ton. $37.09 of wh1ch would go to the government. At this tax rate, net farm income would become negatlve. By allowing three acre-feet per acre of water for $4.00 an acre-foot, the same reduction fn salt discharges could be achleved at a farmer cost of S13.92 per ton, with net soclal cost remainlng at S7.16. Comb1n1ng cost-sharing mechanisms 1nto a "carrot and. stlck" approach provfdes flex1bflfty fn cost dlstrlbutfon. We tested frrfgatfon system subs1d1es wfth both salt and water taxes. and water conservation subsldies with water taxes. As shown by tables 3 and 4, nearly any local cost share can be achfeved by varyfng the level of the "carrot" and/or "st1ck". For example. 15