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OOD9~3 with this amendment, it is an example of one way in which the boards' interests could be expanded through external pressure, California provides an example of no legislative mandate to conserve and the state has operated under years of voluntary conservation and reallocation. . Yet California has tbe most extensive enabling legislation for water transfers to occur and none have taken place as a result of the legislation, Regulation to force change may not be appropriate in all areas, In some districts unregulated irrigators may conserve and/or reallocate their water more than regulated irrigators, If we're going to talk about efficiency solutions, it may be better in some districts to leave people alone, In addition to legislation intended to encourage change including reallocation and transfer, we need legislative constraints in order to protect social values and unnecessary costs during the water transfer process, Rather than talk about this type of regulation as barriers or impediments to transfer it may be better to call these socio-eGOnomic protection devices.. For example, in Colorado the costs incurred in order to protect third parties during transfers is very high compared to the costs in New Mexico where the state engineer has historically considered third party impacts, In New Mexico the costs are lower and we get nearly the same effect. Let's make sure that we use less costly ways to reach the same level of worthwhile protections, PART TWO: IRRIGATION DISTRlCfS AND WATER CONSERVATION In this part of our workshop, we looked at some of the issues posed by the objective conserving water used or man,aged ,by irrigation districts. While the, focus here is on the role of 15