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<br />It should be observed that the Act recog- <br />nizes and affords protection to vested rights. <br />Section 82a-704 provides for the determination <br />of such rights by the Chief Engineer and for a <br />review of his action by appeal to the appropriate <br />state district court. Section 82a-708 provides <br />for the determination of priorities of rights or <br />applicants for permits by the Chief Engineer <br />and for a review of his determinations by appeal <br />to the appropriate state district court. <br />It is true that the Act does not provide for <br />notice to persons, who may be adversely affect- <br />ed by the granting of a permit, of the hearing <br />or of the action by the Chief Engineer upon <br />applications for permits. However, permits are <br />necessarily granted subject to valid existing <br />vested rights and to prior appropriations, and <br />provision for the protection of those rights, <br />either by actions for damages or for injunction, <br />is carefully made by sections 82a-7l2 and <br />82a-716. <br />The power of a state either to modify or re- <br />ject the doctrine of riparian rights because un- <br />suited to the condi tions in the state and to put <br />into force the doctrine of prior appropriation <br />and application to beneficial use or of reason- <br />able use has long been settled by the adjudicated <br />cases. <br />Of course. such a modification in the law of <br />the state must recognize valid existing vested <br />rights, but we do not regard a landowner as hav- <br />ing a vested right in underground waters under- <br />lying his land which he has not appropriated <br />and applied to beneficial use. <br />We hold that the state could properly apply <br />the doctrine of prior appropriation and appli- <br />cation to beneficial use to unused and unappro- <br />priated waters so long as it recognized and <br />afforded protection to rights which landowners <br />had acquired at the time of the effective date of <br />the Act to appropriate and use water. <br />Whether such a change in the law of Kansas <br />is contrary to earlier decisions of the Supreme <br />Court of Kansas, it is cognizant with the latest <br />decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in <br />State ex reI. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, <br />207 P.2d 440, which must be regarded as having <br />overruled the earlier cases. <br />There is no vested right in the decisions of a <br />court and a change of decision does not deprive <br />one of equal protection of the laws or property <br />without due process of law. <br />Even though prior decisions of a state court <br />have established a rule of property, a departure <br />therefrom in a subsequent decision does not, <br /> <br />50 <br /> <br />without more, constitute a deprivation of prop- <br />erty without due process of law under the Four- <br />teenth Amendment. <br />The Fourteenth Amendment in guaranteeing <br />equal protection of the laws does not assure uni- <br />formity of judicial decisions or immunity from <br />judicial error. Likewise, it is well settled that a <br />legisla ture may change the principle of the com- <br />mon law and abrogate decisions made there- <br />under when in the opinion of the legislature it <br />is necessary in the public welfare. <br />Adequate water supply is a necessity. In the <br />arid and semiarid regions of the West it is im- <br />perative that all available water be utilized bene- <br />ficially and without waste. The accomplishment <br />of those ends is well within the competency of <br />the legislature. <br />Plaintiffs have not seen fit to invoke the <br />remedies afforded them by the Act. Those rem- <br />edies are adequate, we think, to afford protec- <br />tion to any vested rights of the plaintiffs. <br />We conclude that the Act is constitutional. 74 <br />The Supreme Court of Kansas stifled the last <br />assault on the constitutionality of the Kansas ap- <br />propriation statutes in 1962. The litigation in <br />which it did so 75 had been instituted by an owner <br />of land in Harvey County to obtain an injunction <br />to prevent the City of Wichita from drilling and <br />pumping wa ter wells in the Equus beds area under <br />the provisions of the Kansas appropriation statutes. <br />The plaintiff had contended that the defendant's <br />activities would divert subterranean percolating <br />water from his land, cause irreparable damage, and <br />constitute an unconstitutional taking of property. <br />Upon trial, the district court found "each and all <br />of the issues of fact and law in favor of the plaintiff <br />and against the defendant, the City of Wichita." It <br />held that the "l945 water appropriation act of <br />Kansas as amended" was unconstitutional and that <br />the city should be permanently enjoined from us- <br />ing its wells. Upon appeal the Supreme Court of <br />Kansas. one justice dissenting, reversed the trial <br />judge and held that the appropriations statutes <br />were constitutional. Writing for the majority of the <br />Court, Justice Fatzer wrote: <br />\Ve find nothing in the Act which in any <br />manner offends the Fourteenth Amendment to <br />the constitution of the United States or in any <br />way violates the constitution of Kansas. ll1ere <br />is no inhibition in our constitution against legis- <br /> <br />74Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 at 624-25 (D. Kan. <br />J 956). <br />75William v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317. 374 P.2d 578 <br />(1962). <br />