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<br />springs are, belong to the owner of the land as <br />much as the land itself, admits of no doubt." 58 <br />Likewise, in the important 1944 decision of the <br />Supreme Court of Kansas that precipitated the <br />enactment of the Kansas appropriation statutes of <br />1945. the Supreme Court of Kansas stated, "An <br />owner of land owns its surface al1d underground <br />water by the same title that he owns the land it- <br />self, and the clay, gravel, coal, or oil within it, <br />even though these items of property differ in com- <br />ponent parts.,,59 These cases did not directly in- <br />volve, however, judicial holdings concerning the <br />relative righ ts of neighboring owners overlying a <br />common source of supply. <br />In ] 946, the Supreme Court of Kansas reiterated <br />earlier pronouncements to the effect that under- <br />ground waters are a part of the real property in <br />which they are located.6o The case in which it did <br />so, however, did not involve a question arising <br />under the then recently enacted appropriation stat- <br />utes. The case merely pertained to a cross-plaintiffs <br />alleged right to damages for violation of his rights <br />as a tenant under a written lease for the use of <br />water from another's land by virtue of a specific <br />oral contract between that other party and the <br />cross-plaintiffs original landlord. The earlier Kansas <br />cases were cited with reference to the applicability <br />of the sta tute of frauds. 61 <br />In 1949 the Supreme Court of Kansas contin- <br />ued to talk in terms of riparian principles in a case <br />in which it affirmed a trial court's denial of a bill <br />brough t by a downstream riparian owner for a <br />mandatory injunction to compel various upstream <br />riparian owners to remove small dams built across <br />a creek.62 In discussing the natural flow and rea- <br />sonable use theories of the riparian doctrine, the <br />Court wrote: <br />The "reasonable use" theory prevails in the <br />great majority of states where the common-law <br />doctrine has been applied. And this theory, as <br />distinguished from the "natural flow" theory, <br />has been adhered to in this state whenever the <br />common-law doctrine of riparian rights was <br />under consideration by this court. . .63 <br />The Court noted that on the appeal both sides <br />h~d relied rhiefly on the common law but that, in <br /> <br />58City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588, 608 (1881); Jobling <br />v. Tuttle, 75 Kan. 35 1,360.89 Pac. 699, 703 (1907). <br />.59State of Kansas ex reI. Peterson, v. Board of Agriculture, 158 <br />Kan. 603, 609,149 P.2d 604,608 (1944). <br />60Arensman v. Kitch, 160 Kan. 783,165 P.2d 441 (1946). <br /> <br />61The statute as cited was Kan. G.S. 1935, 33-106. II now <br />appears as K.S.A. 33-106 (1964). <br />62Heise v. Schulz, 167 Kan. 34, 204 P.2d 706 (1949). <br />631d. at 43,204 P.2d at 712. <br /> <br />48 <br /> <br />addition, the defendants had contended that cer- <br />tain statutes, including the appropriations statutes, <br />compelled affirmance of the trial court's judgment. <br />Concerning this contention, the Court wrote: <br />This statute and others enacted since 1917 <br />(and perhaps since 1911) have undoubtedly <br />modified the common law doctrine of riparian <br />righ ts which theretofore had been the basic <br />principle of water rights in this state. State ex <br />reI. v. Kansas State Board of Agriculture, 158 <br />Kan. 603,608, l49 P.2d 604. However, there is <br />no occasion here to discuss the extent to which <br />that common law doctrine may have been modi- <br />fied by the statutory enactments. We know of <br />no statute which would be of assistance or <br />solace to the plaintiff, and since he has failed to <br />establish any right to an injunction under the <br />broader and more elastic common law doctrine, <br />a further discussion of the statutory right of de- <br />fendants would be of little purpose.64 <br />In 1956, the Supreme Court of Kansas again <br />applied riparian principles.65 The Court did ob- <br />serve, however, that the "defendants had not ap- <br />plied for any appropriation rights from the Division <br />of Water Resources under the provisions of G.S.: <br />1949, 82a-701 et seq.,,66 The decision was based <br />upon the reasonable use doctrine as outlined in the <br />Court's 1949 decision. <br />Since the enactment of the water appropriation <br />statutes in 1945 and thereafter, the courts have de- <br />cided three importan t cases involving the consti tu- <br />tionality of those statutes.67 The Supreme Court <br />of Kansas has also decided several other cases, of <br />considerably less importance, involving the appro- <br />priation statutes. 68 <br />In the first of the three cases that recognized the <br />constitutionality of the water appropriations stat- <br />utes,69 a majority of the qualified owners of irriga- <br />ble lands on and near the Republican' River in <br />north-central Kansas petitioned the Chief Engineer <br />of the Division of Water Resources of the Kansas <br />State Board of Agriculture for authority to incor- <br />porate and also fiied an application for a permit to <br /> <br />64ld. at45, 204 P.2d at 713-14. <br />65Weaver v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 180 Kan. 224, 303 P.2d 159 <br />(1956). <br />661d. at 229, 303 P.2d 163. <br /> <br />67State of Kansas, ex reI. Emery, v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207 <br />P.2d 440 (1949); Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. <br />Kan. 1956), affirmed 352 U.S. 863 (1956); and, Williams v. <br />City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 3 17, 374 P.2d 578 (1962). <br />68For example, see Artesian Valley Water Conservation Ass'n. <br />v. Division of Water Resources and Robert V. Smrha, 174 <br />Kan. 212,255 P.2d 1015 (1953), and City of McPherson v. <br />Smrha, 179 Kan. 59, 293 P.2d 239 (1956). <br />69State of Kansas, ex reI. Emery, v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546,207 <br />P.2d 440 (1949). <br />