<br />springs are, belong to the owner of the land as
<br />much as the land itself, admits of no doubt." 58
<br />Likewise, in the important 1944 decision of the
<br />Supreme Court of Kansas that precipitated the
<br />enactment of the Kansas appropriation statutes of
<br />1945. the Supreme Court of Kansas stated, "An
<br />owner of land owns its surface al1d underground
<br />water by the same title that he owns the land it-
<br />self, and the clay, gravel, coal, or oil within it,
<br />even though these items of property differ in com-
<br />ponent parts.,,59 These cases did not directly in-
<br />volve, however, judicial holdings concerning the
<br />relative righ ts of neighboring owners overlying a
<br />common source of supply.
<br />In ] 946, the Supreme Court of Kansas reiterated
<br />earlier pronouncements to the effect that under-
<br />ground waters are a part of the real property in
<br />which they are located.6o The case in which it did
<br />so, however, did not involve a question arising
<br />under the then recently enacted appropriation stat-
<br />utes. The case merely pertained to a cross-plaintiffs
<br />alleged right to damages for violation of his rights
<br />as a tenant under a written lease for the use of
<br />water from another's land by virtue of a specific
<br />oral contract between that other party and the
<br />cross-plaintiffs original landlord. The earlier Kansas
<br />cases were cited with reference to the applicability
<br />of the sta tute of frauds. 61
<br />In 1949 the Supreme Court of Kansas contin-
<br />ued to talk in terms of riparian principles in a case
<br />in which it affirmed a trial court's denial of a bill
<br />brough t by a downstream riparian owner for a
<br />mandatory injunction to compel various upstream
<br />riparian owners to remove small dams built across
<br />a creek.62 In discussing the natural flow and rea-
<br />sonable use theories of the riparian doctrine, the
<br />Court wrote:
<br />The "reasonable use" theory prevails in the
<br />great majority of states where the common-law
<br />doctrine has been applied. And this theory, as
<br />distinguished from the "natural flow" theory,
<br />has been adhered to in this state whenever the
<br />common-law doctrine of riparian rights was
<br />under consideration by this court. . .63
<br />The Court noted that on the appeal both sides
<br />h~d relied rhiefly on the common law but that, in
<br />
<br />58City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588, 608 (1881); Jobling
<br />v. Tuttle, 75 Kan. 35 1,360.89 Pac. 699, 703 (1907).
<br />.59State of Kansas ex reI. Peterson, v. Board of Agriculture, 158
<br />Kan. 603, 609,149 P.2d 604,608 (1944).
<br />60Arensman v. Kitch, 160 Kan. 783,165 P.2d 441 (1946).
<br />
<br />61The statute as cited was Kan. G.S. 1935, 33-106. II now
<br />appears as K.S.A. 33-106 (1964).
<br />62Heise v. Schulz, 167 Kan. 34, 204 P.2d 706 (1949).
<br />631d. at 43,204 P.2d at 712.
<br />
<br />48
<br />
<br />addition, the defendants had contended that cer-
<br />tain statutes, including the appropriations statutes,
<br />compelled affirmance of the trial court's judgment.
<br />Concerning this contention, the Court wrote:
<br />This statute and others enacted since 1917
<br />(and perhaps since 1911) have undoubtedly
<br />modified the common law doctrine of riparian
<br />righ ts which theretofore had been the basic
<br />principle of water rights in this state. State ex
<br />reI. v. Kansas State Board of Agriculture, 158
<br />Kan. 603,608, l49 P.2d 604. However, there is
<br />no occasion here to discuss the extent to which
<br />that common law doctrine may have been modi-
<br />fied by the statutory enactments. We know of
<br />no statute which would be of assistance or
<br />solace to the plaintiff, and since he has failed to
<br />establish any right to an injunction under the
<br />broader and more elastic common law doctrine,
<br />a further discussion of the statutory right of de-
<br />fendants would be of little purpose.64
<br />In 1956, the Supreme Court of Kansas again
<br />applied riparian principles.65 The Court did ob-
<br />serve, however, that the "defendants had not ap-
<br />plied for any appropriation rights from the Division
<br />of Water Resources under the provisions of G.S.:
<br />1949, 82a-701 et seq.,,66 The decision was based
<br />upon the reasonable use doctrine as outlined in the
<br />Court's 1949 decision.
<br />Since the enactment of the water appropriation
<br />statutes in 1945 and thereafter, the courts have de-
<br />cided three importan t cases involving the consti tu-
<br />tionality of those statutes.67 The Supreme Court
<br />of Kansas has also decided several other cases, of
<br />considerably less importance, involving the appro-
<br />priation statutes. 68
<br />In the first of the three cases that recognized the
<br />constitutionality of the water appropriations stat-
<br />utes,69 a majority of the qualified owners of irriga-
<br />ble lands on and near the Republican' River in
<br />north-central Kansas petitioned the Chief Engineer
<br />of the Division of Water Resources of the Kansas
<br />State Board of Agriculture for authority to incor-
<br />porate and also fiied an application for a permit to
<br />
<br />64ld. at45, 204 P.2d at 713-14.
<br />65Weaver v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 180 Kan. 224, 303 P.2d 159
<br />(1956).
<br />661d. at 229, 303 P.2d 163.
<br />
<br />67State of Kansas, ex reI. Emery, v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207
<br />P.2d 440 (1949); Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D.
<br />Kan. 1956), affirmed 352 U.S. 863 (1956); and, Williams v.
<br />City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 3 17, 374 P.2d 578 (1962).
<br />68For example, see Artesian Valley Water Conservation Ass'n.
<br />v. Division of Water Resources and Robert V. Smrha, 174
<br />Kan. 212,255 P.2d 1015 (1953), and City of McPherson v.
<br />Smrha, 179 Kan. 59, 293 P.2d 239 (1956).
<br />69State of Kansas, ex reI. Emery, v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546,207
<br />P.2d 440 (1949).
<br />
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