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<br />. <br /> <br />~ <br />o <br />....J <br />f\.) <br /> <br />programs fall into this category, they should be tried only <br />after all others have been found unworkable. <br />Thus, first consideration ought to be given to control <br />schemes under the second and third categories. <br />Many of the specific schemes under these two categor- <br />ies are undesirable in that they involve charges or payments <br />for the wrong thing. If it is desired to reduce air pollution, <br />then the charge 101' payment should depend on the amount of <br />pollutants discharged and not on an activity that is directly <br />or indirectly related to the discharge of pollutants. For <br />example, an excise tax on coal is less desirable than a tax <br />on the discharge of pollutants resulting from burning coal <br />because the former distorts resource use in favor of other <br />fuels and against devices to remove pollutants from stack <br />gases after burning coal. As a second example, a payment <br />to firms for decreasing the discharge of pollutants is better <br />than a tax credit for investment in pollution-control devices <br />because the latter introduces a bias against other means of <br />reducing the discharge of pollutants, such as the burning of <br />nonpolluting fuels. Thus, many control schemes can be eli- <br />minated on the principle that more efficient control can <br />normally be obtained by incentives that depend on the variable <br />it is desired to influence rather than by incentives that depend <br />on a related variable. <br />Many of the specific schemes under Payments can be <br />eliminated on the grounds that they propose to subsidize the <br />purchase of devices that neither add to revenues nor reduce <br />costs. Thus, if a pollution-control device neither helps to <br />produce salable products nor reduces production costs, a <br />firm really receives very little incentive to buy the device <br />even if the government offers to pay half the cost. All that <br />such subsidy schemes accomplish is to reduce somewhat the <br />resistance to direct controls. Of course, some control de- <br />vices may help to recover wastes that can be made into sal- <br />able products. Although there are isolated examples of the <br />recovery of valuable wastes in the process of air-pollution <br />control, it is hard to know whether such possibilities are ex- <br />tensive. A careful survey of this subject would be interesting. <br />However, the key point is that, to the extent that waste recov- <br />ery is desirable, firms receive the appropriate incentive to <br />recover wastes by the use of fees or payments that are related <br />to the discharge of effluents. Therefore, even the possibility <br />of waste recovery does not justify subsidization of devices to <br />recover wastes. <br />The foregoing analysis creates a presumption in favor <br />of schemes under which either payments are made for reducing <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />34 <br /> <br />. <br />