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<br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />oI;lo. <br />o <br />en <br />...J <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />upstream users to reduce pollution). <br /> <br />Legal regulation of point sources is expected to be relatively ef- <br /> <br />fective, because of the east of implementation. Legal restraints would. <br /> <br />either elimina.te the activity or cause the individual or firm to absorb <br /> <br />the costs of meeting restrictions. The reduction in output would again <br /> <br />be expected to depend upon the elasticity of demand (MVP) of water. <br /> <br />Legal regulation of diffuse sources faces the same problems as <br /> <br />economic regulation. If sources are not individually identifiable, reg- <br /> <br />ulation must be implemented either for diversions or at some further <br /> <br />removed source of input which can be monitored and policed (for ex- <br /> <br />ample, the control of outboard motor pollution by imposing restric- <br /> <br />tions on manufacturers of the motors rather tha.n on boaters). Further, <br /> <br />the broader the area from which pollution arises, the more difficult <br /> <br />will be implementation of regulations. Some aspects of the free-rider <br /> <br />problem must arise, since polluters cannot be individually identified. <br /> <br />The liklihood of compliance will be less if detection is difficult and <br /> <br />cost of compliance is high. <br /> <br />A direct regulation of activity may be required, rather than pol- <br /> <br />lution control measures in diffuse source areas. The broader the in- <br /> <br />stitutional restriction, from the activity regulation standpoint, the <br /> <br />more resistance (both overt and covert) which might be expected from <br /> <br />those involved. <br /> <br />The effectiveness of both the economic and legal institutional <br /> <br />29 <br />