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Last modified
1/26/2010 12:28:27 PM
Creation date
10/11/2006 10:01:54 PM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
Water Supply Protection
File Number
8272.600.60
Description
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program - Basin Member State Info - Utah
Basin
Colorado Mainstem
Water Division
5
Date
3/7/1975
Title
Colorado Regional Assessment Study - Phase One Report for the National Commission on Water Quality - Part 2 of 2 -- Chapter VI - end
Water Supply Pro - Doc Type
Report/Study
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<br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />costs, they should be undertaken. <br /> <br />Iof;>. <br />o <br />o <br />CJ; <br /> <br />Public investment in specific quality-improving projects can only <br /> <br />very indirectly contribute to the solution of the external effects problem <br /> <br />posed in Figure VI-I, however. Even though MED shifts downward and <br /> <br />to the right and the socially optimum level of water use upstream increases, <br /> <br />there will still be a discrepancy between the social optimum and the private <br /> <br />optimum at OA' unless the shift in MED is very large. The act of public <br /> <br />investment provides no incentive whatever for the upstream irrigator to <br /> <br />act in a socially optimum manner. It is likely, therefore, that these <br /> <br />investment options can mitigate the damages caused by the externality <br /> <br />prohlem, but cannot solve the problem by inducing the irrigators to use <br /> <br />the socially optimum quantity of water. This problem must be attacked <br /> <br />with other policy options to be discussed later under economic incentives. <br /> <br />Litii(ation. In a free society parties injured by actions of other parties <br /> <br />can bring damage suits in a court of law to recover their losses. Down- <br /> <br />stream users could sue upstream irrigators and either prevent them from <br /> <br />producing wastes or force them to pay damages. This is seldom done. <br /> <br />Although their discussion applies mostly to industrial polluters, Kneese <br /> <br />3 <br />and Bower offer an explanation that applies remarkably well to irrigation <br /> <br />pollution as well: "1) Adversary proceedings are a cumbersome procedure.. . , <br />\ <br />2) wide dispersion of damages' makes it hard to bring suit for full damages, <br /> <br />(wide dispersion of 'damagers' makes it doubly difficult)4..., 3) waste <br /> <br />discharge imposes costs in a highly variable fashion over time. .. , <br /> <br />13 <br /> <br />L ~ <br />
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