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<br />stimulate more competition than an allocation of <br />power only to municipal utilities. <br /> <br />Western is not persuaded. This proposal would <br />assume that the internal competition within UP&L <br />generated by the proposed billing methodology <br />would be at least as advantageous as the <br />competition that exists under current "yardstick" <br />principles. The competition for new industry that <br />arises between an investor-owned utility and a <br />public utility would be diluted under UP&L's <br />plan. Competition for existing customers would <br />also be lessened. Cf. North Carolina v. VEPCO, 311 <br />S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1984). Also, the advantages of <br />public power that might cause a municipality to <br />terminate its status as a UP&L customer in favor <br />of preference utility status would be diminished. <br />This would dilute the competition for municipal <br />loads between UP&L and preference utilities. <br /> <br />The legislative history underlying various Federal <br />preference clauses also refutes UP&L's arguments <br />on the relative merits of its yardstick proposal. <br />In addition to the citations of legislative <br />history provided by the American Public Power <br />Association and the National Rural Electric <br />Cooperative Association, Western believes that the <br /> <br />37 <br />