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<br />
<br />52
<br />
<br />STANFORD LAW REVIEW
<br />
<br />[Vol. '9: P2ge,
<br />
<br />Finally, the existence of congressional apportionment power permits
<br />the acltievement of results that the Court could not accomplish and that a
<br />compact is not likely to. The Pacific Southwest Water Plan,'" in immedi.
<br />ate prospect, and the North American Water and Power Alliance,'" in
<br />remoter view, both exemplify the emerging concept of long-distance, trans.
<br />basin water transfers. The Court could not apportion a part of the Columbia
<br />River system to Arizona-since equitable apportionment is limited to bor,
<br />dering or successive streams. A compact between Washington and Arizona
<br />allocating Columbia water to Arizona is without precedent and is likely to
<br />remain so because there is insullicient inducement for one state to export its
<br />water to another. As a practical matter, then, if we are to have interregional
<br />water transfers, Congress must make them and must have the concomitant
<br />power to settle interstate disputes generated by the development plan.
<br />It can be fairly objected that the grant of power to Congress to apportion
<br />rivers will weaken the institution of the interstate compact. First, state oBi,
<br />cials who must bear the responsibility for a compact settlement can avoid
<br />the political liabilities of the unfavorable parts of a settlement by blaming
<br />them on Congress. Even the states' congressional delegations can take tb~
<br />position that they were overwhelmed by superior numbers. To dilute tb~
<br />responsibility of elected ollicials is to weaken democratic ~overnment. In
<br />addition, and cumulative in effect, congressional apportionment may be a
<br />welcome alternative to Supreme Court adjudication, the threat of wlticb
<br />formerly drove the parties to a compact agreement. With the availability of
<br />congressional apportionment, over which the state has greater control than
<br />it does over litigation, the stimulus for compact settlement is reduced.
<br />Do we care that compacts will decline in use? Those who wish to bring
<br />decision making closer to the voter will care. The action of a state legis.
<br />lature approving or disapproving a compact is more likely to express tb~
<br />views of more voters in a signatory state than is approval or disapproval by
<br />the Congress. The author is not wholly convinced of the value of bringing
<br />the decision to approve or reject an instrument as complex as an interstat,
<br />stream compact closer to the people, but, even if he were, the gains from
<br />congressional power to apportion would have to be weighed against th,
<br />loss of greater citizen participation in the decision. In assessing the gainl
<br />we must recognize that failure to reach agreement by compact has occurred
<br />
<br />.208. The Pacific Southwest Water Plan IS designed to provide supplementary walei' resotutl'
<br />for the lDwc:r Colorado River Basin and for southerD California. It cont~mpb.te5 merging portiolll
<br />of the WafU rC:5OWc.t.5 of [he Colorado Riva B.iI.sin, the Gr~t Basin, the Central P.ilcific Basin, Int
<br />the South 'Pacific Basin.
<br />209. 'J'he North AmeriC.ilD WOlter and Power Alliance concept contempbtes distributing the 0'
<br />cess water of the non.hw~[ern areas of the Norlh Ameriun continent to the w.ilter-ddi.cient ams
<br />of the Canadian prairies, the United States, and northun Mexico in sufficient quanrities to eosurt
<br />adequate wata supplio for at least the oe:'1t hundre:d )'e:an, One: of the: cenU;a\ fe;atures of thu 101\1'
<br />range: plan i! ;a :5oo.mile.long reservoir in the 5<<tiOQ of western Canada known as the Rocky Moult"
<br />tain Trench.
<br />
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<br />1',,,,,,,,,,,,,'#J
<br />
<br />in a si~nilicant nur
<br />in th~ furure, and I
<br />cli'i",uri\'c power, I
<br />Con;:ress th~ powe
<br />It> h2\"r ;ad\'ant3f:e,
<br />bc-f:C1',inform~d d~r
<br />.k>'d(1pm~nt of a b:
<br />,I""... ;an apportion:
<br />tb~" with a judicial
<br />
<br />:. F.x('f("isr of /h.
<br />
<br />While it 1'3s oc
<br />C:'''''1 "i'rUI~d th~
<br />1\"..., 2mOnj; Arizc
<br />Ih,t..n. Stcwart, an,
<br />intrn,lnI to cx~rciSt
<br />tu..nll>orh in .the /of
<br />.....~hinE: much is gai:
<br />tlO(' leE:id2ti\'e rn3t~r:
<br />uno miJ:ht question "
<br />,.. ".e Scu~l.1r)' of th
<br />II,. >lnl/o:l:lr 10 rC3ch
<br />ot...J.lnl with I>oth ir
<br />J:fn> h"ll>roken !lIe
<br />t.al"\ " lule is in .:lcrua'
<br />(:"I.E"rui2..r .1-1 rniJli
<br />to. ~11'''rl''''''' Congr,
<br />""", 0"1'1'1)' or Waler
<br />,.,n. ~J:.inst Ihe ccilj
<br />C':"!d.,rlli;J h;JJ \ltala I
<br />""II,,,,, ~rr~.r('Ct appo
<br />A, I. II LlLe. nu leap of
<br />_i"S-I'IUUl\lnrnl u{ the
<br />^ anulI.! 1'0il1l in I
<br />c.~lj;rr.. intended to
<br />~. a. I,r LlW iii. TIll
<br />ib."Uj:M ol.ould hr pr,
<br />C".am. 11,u.. if the a
<br />""Icrt C21i1orni;a ",.
<br />11.u rnull W2' altribL
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