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., . . More important than pinpointing the exact nature of a compact is to deter- mine what effect Congressional approval has on a compact. When two or more states undertake to solve a common problem by agreement by virtue of the Com- pact Clause of the United States Constitution, they must receive the approval of Congress beCare any such agreement can be effective. Does that approval constitute the last word that Congress may have in the matter~ Does it make Congress akin to a signatory party or does it make Congress the final decision maker? Is it possible for Congress to later withdraw its approval? The ans.wer may depend upon the subject matter of the compact itself. An ordinary statute enacted by Congress is the law of the land so long as it is not repealed or superceded by a later act or Congress or ruled unconstitutional by a court. That is, in the case of ordinary enactments. the law may change as often as Congress sees fit. An interstate compact is not a mere creature of Congress, even though Congress must act to give its consent ~o effectuate a com- pact. An interstate compac,t is more like a contract, in that (t: represents the voluntary agreement of two or more states to the disposition of B. matter which woui~ alternatively be settled through litigation. tn order to have any p~xyose, an inters.tate compact must be binding on the signatory parties as a contract would be. If this were not the case, then a compact could be altered at the whim of any party state or Congress and there would be no incentive for the states to negotiate an agreement as an alternative to litigation. This is true especially in a case such as is presented here with respect to the Colorado River Compact and Upper Colorado River Basin Compact. Water rights have been held to be property rights by the courts of the respective basin states, Strickler Y. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 26 P.313 (189t); Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502,35 P. 475 (1894); Fisher v. Bountiful City, 21 Utah 29, 59 P. 520 (1899); Ormsby County v. Kearney, 37 Ney. 314,142 P. 803 (1914); Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman, 152 Cal 716, 93 P. 858 (1908); Clodfelter Y. Reynolds, 68 N.;1. 61, 358 P.2d 626 (196t); Hamblin v. Woolley, 64 Ariz. 152, 167 P.2d 100 (1948); and by the U. S. Supreme Court, Hinderlider v. La Plata River &- Cherry Creek Ditch Co., supra. The manner in which these property rights are acquired or conveyed differs in each state and is governed by the respective state law. The property nature of water rights makes the Colorado River interstate compacts similar to boundary compacts in that the -10-