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<br />As previously noted, the object of a carrier company is tv.o-fold,
<br />namelYI To aid consumers in obtaining vlater, and for its private gain.
<br />Yfhen a mere contract oonsumer severs his relation with the carrier, the
<br />latter is not required, for that reason alone, to l,ermit the volwne whioh
<br />it had theretofore diverted from the stream for the benefit of the oonsumer
<br />to remain in the source of supply. If the rule were othen'lise, and a con-
<br />tract consumer beoame an appropriator from the river, in the full meaning
<br />of that term, as held by the trial court, then the carrier would be compellec'
<br />to await the pleasure of the contract oonsumer with respect to the use of
<br />water after onoe contracting with him, and its revenues would be dependent
<br />upon his whim, while others in the interim would be deprived of the use of
<br />the volume which the pricr contract consumer had once utilized, but had
<br />ceased to use. The 1!ll'1 does not permit such unjust and anomalous results
<br />to grow out of tIle relation of carrier and simple contraot users. The
<br />priorities awarded a carrier ditch are for the benefit of those entitled
<br />to use the water which they represent. This means those who are entitled
<br />to be supplied with water from the ditch, to which the priorities are awarded,
<br />Yfhen these rights are evidenced by a contract between the consumer and
<br />oarrier for a specified volume for a specified period, the obligation assum-
<br />ed by the carrier is to deliver that volume for the period and purpose named
<br />in the contract. That is all the consumer contracted for. Such a contraot
<br />is in no sense illeg~l or against public pOlicy, and the consumer will not
<br />be heard to say that his contract conferred greater or different rights than
<br />those specified, save and exoept that having onoe become a contract user, he
<br />will be entitled to continue that relation from year to year thereaft.er, with,:.,.,
<br />intermission, hmvever, unless limited in the exercise of this right by a vali~
<br />provision in his contract, upon tender annually of a lawful rate of oarriage,
<br />and in oompliance with the reasonable regulations of the carrier. The right"
<br />of the contract consumer as thus defined, afford full protection to all.
<br />Hhen the oonsumer's contractual relations with the carrier are severed,
<br />the obligations of the carrier are ended, and the consumer cannot complaint
<br />because the rights of others have intervened by contract with the carrier
<br />for the use of water. That is their right, when the carrier has water un-
<br />disposed of; and if it refuses the request of bona fide applicants, it can
<br />be oompelled to comply wi th their needs to the extent it has water which it
<br />can lawfully control. If a mere contraot user becomes an unqualified appro<'
<br />priator of water from the river supplying a carrier ditch, then certainly
<br />he ought to be required to compensate the carrier for the carriage of water,
<br />whether he is using it or not; and yet; we apprehend that when his contract
<br />expired, if the carrier should undert~ce to exact such compensation, his
<br />oomplete defense would be that his contract did not impose any such an
<br />obligation. The unjust results whioh would follow' in ruling that a mere con~
<br />tract user is an unqualified appropriator make it apparent that his right is
<br />limited by the terms of his oontract, so far as valid, and that when he
<br />voluntarily ceases, at the expiration of his contract, to exercise his right
<br />to continue his contractual relations with the carrier, or preserve the
<br />status growing out of that relation, that his future 'rights only date from
<br />the time he again contracts with the c~rier for water, or makes a demand
<br />to be supplied with water in circumstances with which the carrier is legally
<br />bound to comply. This conclusion logically leads to the further one, that
<br />parties tc the acticn, who from their pleadings and proof, did not establish
<br />that the city, as the beneficial owner of the ditch, was under any obligation
<br />to furnish them water at the time they became parties, Vlere without any righ'~R
<br />which oould be either adjudicated or recognized.
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