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<br />001063 <br /> <br />077-19-.91581-MR - COLORADO .rATER CONSERVATION BOARD <br /> <br />that the stream was a tributary to the river, and that the waters of <br />that oreek were subjeot to the priorities alrea~ adjudicated upon the <br />river and its tributaries. In adjudicaticn prooeedings under the <br />statute, in 1883, defendants were allowed priorities on too South <br />Platte which will be adversely affected if plaintiff be now awarded <br />title to and a right of use, paramount to their rights, of too Big <br />Dry Creek water as prayed. <br /> <br />, <br />~ <br /> <br />It is definitely and firmly settled that the distribution <br />and use of water in this state is subjeot to and oontrolled by the <br />dootrine of appropriation. A statutory proceedings is provided for <br />the determination of suoh right of use, the fundamental principle of <br />which is that the one who is "First in time, is first in right." <br />Af'ter the lapse of the two and four year periods of limitation pre- <br />soribed by statute rights so deoreed becOlllll absolute. It is plain. <br />therefore, that the real questi on before us is whether water rights <br />may be establisned by prescription end adverse use in derogation of <br />those statutory prOvisions, by one who has had full opportunity to <br />assert his right thereunder. <br /> <br />Plaintiff olaims in substance that by prior possession end <br />use of this water its right has beoome paramount to all others, junior <br />or .senior, deoreed or otherwise. This is in effect a collateral attack <br />upon a judg,ment long since made absolute by the statute of limitation. <br /> <br />In Comstook v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 133 Pao. 1107, an <br />attanpt was made to appropriate seepage and return water that was inter- <br />cepted while on its way baok to too South Platte River. The attempt <br />was made on the theory that the water was entirely separate frC1Jll the <br />fICWi' of the river. and therefore independent of all appropriations <br />upon that stream. In this case it is also claimed that too waters of <br />Big Dry Creek never have been permitted to reach the river, being <br />intercepted end used by plaintiff without reference to adjudioated <br />rights, and for this reason the olaim of title by presoription is <br />made. In, in re German Ditch Company, supra, as heretofore indioated, <br />it was held that Big Dry Creek is tributary to the South Platte River. <br />In speaking of the law governing tributary waters in Comstock v. <br />Ramsay, supra, tlus court, at page 255, saidl <br /> <br />"There is no law anywhere to support the contention that <br />if these waters are naturally tributary to too riyer, still they may <br />be taken by a new clail!llUl.t to the damage and injury of prior appro- <br />priators upon that stream, simply because he captures and diverts <br />them before they actually get into the river channel. If such act of <br />oapture and diversion can be upheld as lawful and proper, by the <br />same reaSoning a new claimant oould divert the waters of a surfaoe <br />tributary, if he only be spry enough to oapture and divert them before <br />they actually reach and mingle with the waters of the main stream. II <br /> <br />If the theory of plaintiff be upheld, then the right of any <br />appropriator under any adjudioation decree may be divested at any time <br /> <br />-2- <br />